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HEALTH CARE ISSUES AFFECTING PEOPLE 
WITH AN INTERSEX CONDITION OR DSD: 
SEX OR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION? 
Julie A. Greenberg* 
        People with an intersex condition or a Difference of Sex 
Development (DSD) depend on health care professionals for critical 
medical treatment. Many intersex activists assert that some current 
medical practices are not in the best interests of patients with an 
intersex condition. They contend that greater safeguards should be 
adopted to ensure that the rights to liberty and autonomy of people with 
a DSD are respected. 
        Thus far, intersex advocacy has focused on extralegal strategies. 
The movement is at a point, however, where legal challenges to current 
medical protocols could provide an additional tool to improve life-
altering health care practices. This Article examines whether the 
intersex movement could effectively use legal frameworks developed by 
feminists, the LGBT movement, and disability activists to advance its 
goal of modifying current medical procedures that are based on sex, 
gender, sexual orientation, and disability stereotypes. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I want to thank Anne Tamar-Mattis 
and Robert Irving for their extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. My 
sincere gratitude goes to the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for organizing an extraordinary 
Symposium on LGBT Identity and the Law and inviting me to participate. This Article builds on 
ideas presented in JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MATTERS 
(2012), published by NYU Press. 
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Other Symposium participants examined the problems 
confronting lesbians, gays, and bisexuals (LGBs) seeking access to 
effective health care. People with an intersex condition or a DSD 
(Difference of Sex Development) and transgender people are 
affected by similar issues of stigma and discrimination in the 
provision of medical services. Intersex and transgender people, 
however, face an additional problem not encountered by LGBs; they 
are often dependent on health care professionals for critical medical 
treatment related to their intersex and transgender conditions. The 
number of health care professionals experienced in the treatment of 
intersexuality and transgenderism is limited, and often medical 
professionals’ treatment recommendations are at odds with the 
desires of their intersex or transgender patients. Therefore, when 
intersex and transgender people advocate for changes in the health 
care provided to people in their communities, they must carefully 
consider how the approaches they adopt will be received by the 
medical professionals who, to a large extent, control their medical 
treatment options. 
This Article examines the unique health care issues confronting 
the intersex community.
1
 It explores whether the intersex movement 
could effectively use legal frameworks developed by the disability 
rights movement, feminists, and LGBT activists and scholars to 
advance the intersex movement’s major goal of modifying current 
medical practices. Thus far, intersex advocacy has focused on 
extralegal strategies.
2
 The movement is at the point, however, where 
legal challenges to current medical protocols could provide an 
additional useful tool to challenge life-altering health care practices. 
 
 1. A number of publications have addressed the special health care issues facing people 
who are transgender. See, e.g., Kari E. Hong, Categorical Exclusions: Exploring Legal Responses 
to Health Care Discrimination Against Transsexuals, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 88 (2002); 
Dean Spade et al., Medicaid Policy and Gender-Confirming Healthcare for Trans People: An 
Interview with Advocates, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 497 (2010); NAT’L COAL. FOR LGBT 
HEALTH, AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRANS HEALTH PRIORITIES: A REPORT BY THE ELIMINATING 
DISPARITIES WORKING GROUP (2004), available at http://transequality.org/PDFs/Health 
Priorities.pdf; Transgender Health and the Law: Identifying and Fighting Health Care 
Discrimination, TRANSGENDER LAW CTR. (July 2004), http://transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf/ 
Health%20Law%20fact%20sheet.pdf. 
 2. JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MATTERS 85–95 
(2012). 
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Understanding the special health care concerns of people with 
an intersex condition requires an understanding of the historical and 
current medical treatment of intersexuality. The major intersex 
conditions and the medical and societal treatment of people with an 
intersex condition are described in Part I. Part II provides greater 
detail regarding the intersex community’s concerns about current 
medical protocols. Part III examines the informed consent doctrine 
and explains why medical procedures performed on children with an 
intersex condition should be scrutinized more carefully than they are 
under current informed consent protocols. Part IV explores the 
potential legal theories the intersex movement could adopt to 
accomplish its primary goal of modifying current medical practices. 
The Article concludes by examining whether the intersex movement 
could effectively advance its agenda by adopting legal strategies 
developed by feminists, LGBT scholars and activists, and disability 
rights advocates. 
I.  TERMINOLOGY  
AND HISTORY 
A.  What Is Intersexuality? 
The meaning of the term “intersex” has varied and is still a topic 
of sometimes intense discussion.
3
 Although doctors and activists in 
the intersex community continue to debate exactly what conditions 
qualify as “intersex,” the term is often used to include anyone with a 
congenital condition whose sex chromosomes, gonads, or internal or 
external sexual anatomy do not fit clearly into the binary 
male/female norm.
4
 Some intersex conditions involve an 
inconsistency between a person’s internal and external sexual 
features. For example, some people with an intersex condition may 
have female-appearing external genitalia, no internal female organs, 
and testicles.
5
 Other people with an intersex condition may be born 
 
 3. Id. at 131–32; M. Morgan Holmes, Straddling Past, Present and Future, in CRITICAL 
INTERSEX 1, 1 (Morgan Holmes et al. eds., 2009). 
 4. Intersex FAQ, INTERSEX INITIATIVE, http://www.ipdx.org/articles/intersex-faq.html (last 
updated June 29, 2008); What Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/ 
what_is_intersex (last visited Jan. 25, 2012). 
 5. For example, women with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS) have XY 
chromosomes and normal functioning testes. Because of a receptor defect, their bodies are unable 
to process the testosterone produced by the testes and their bodies follow the female 
developmental path. External female genitalia will form but no internal female reproductive 
  
854 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:849 
with genitalia that do not appear to be clearly male or female. For 
example, a girl may be born with a larger than average clitoris and no 
vagina.
6
 Similarly, a boy may be born with a small penis or no 
penis.
7
 Some people with an intersex condition may also be born 
with a chromosomal pattern that does not fall into the binary XX/XY 
norm.
8
 
Not all intersex conditions are apparent at the time of birth; 
some conditions are not evident until a child reaches puberty.
9
 In 
some conditions, a child whose genitalia appeared to be female at 
birth will masculinize in puberty.
10
 Other intersex conditions may be 
discovered at puberty when the child fails to develop typical male or 
female traits. For example, the condition may be discovered when a 
girl reaches puberty and fails to menstruate.
11
 
Because experts do not agree on exactly which conditions fit 
within the definition of intersexuality and some conditions are not 
evident until years after a child is born, it is impossible to state with 
precision exactly how many people have an intersex condition. Most 
experts agree, however, that approximately 1–2 percent of people are 
 
organs (uterus and fallopian tubes) will develop. See Melissa Hines et al., Psychological 
Outcomes and Gender-Related Development in Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, 32 
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 93, 93 (2003). For a more detailed description of this and other 
intersex conditions, see ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 52–53 (2000); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and 
Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 281–
92 (1999). 
 6. For example, infants with partial androgen insensitivity syndrome (PAIS) have XY 
chromosomes and their bodies are able to partially process the androgens produced by their testes. 
Their genitalia will partially masculinize. S. Faisal Ahmed et al., Phenotypic Features, Androgen 
Receptor Binding, and Mutational Analysis in 278 Clinical Cases Reported as Androgen 
Insensitivity Syndrome, 85 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 658, 658 (2000). 
 7. See e.g., William G. Reiner & Bradley P. Kropp, A 7-Year Experience of Genetic Males 
with Severe Phallic Inadequacy Assigned Female, 172 J. UROLOGY 2395 (2004). 
 8. For example, a number of people have chromosomal patterns that vary from the typical 
XX and XY patterns. People have been found with XXX, XXY, XXXY, XYY, XYYY, XYYYY, 
and XO (signifying only one sex chromosome). ROBERT POOL, EVE’S RIB: SEARCHING FOR THE 
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF SEX DIFFERENCES 70, 71 (1994). 
 9. See e.g., Julianne Imperato-McGinley et al., Steroid 5 Alpha-Reductase Deficiency in 
Man: An Inherited Form of Male Pseudohermaphroditism, 186 SCIENCE 1213 (1974). 
 10. For example, people with 5-alpha-reductase deficiency have XY chromosomes and 
testes but appear phenotypically female at birth. Despite a female appearance during childhood, 
by the onset of puberty the body will masculinize. The testes descend, the voice deepens, muscle 
mass substantially increases, and a penis that is capable of ejaculating develops from what was 
thought to be the clitoris. Id. 
 11. For example, sometimes physicians are unaware that an infant with typical female 
genitalia at birth has CAIS if the testes are nestled in the abdominal cavity. The condition may not 
be discovered until puberty, when the girl fails to menstruate. See Hines et al., supra note 5, at 93. 
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born with sexual features that vary from the medically defined norm 
for male and female.
12
 Approximately one in 1,500 to one in 2,000 
births involve a child who is born so noticeably atypical in terms of 
genitalia that a specialist in sex differentiation is consulted and 
surgical alteration is considered.
13
 
The term “intersex” itself is controversial. Many doctors and 
community activists favor abandoning the term “intersex” in favor of 
the term “Disorders of Sex Development” (DSD). Some who support 
the use of DSD terminology have argued that the term “disorder” 
should be dropped and the initial “D” should stand for differences 
rather than disorders.
14
 Throughout this Article, the terms intersex 
and DSD (denoting Differences of Sex Development) will be used 
interchangeably. 
B.  Intersexuality Compared to  
Transsexuality and Transgenderism 
Some people are confused about how intersexuality compares to 
transsexuality and transgenderism. Generally, intersexuality refers to 
a condition in which a person’s biological sex markers are not all 
clearly male or female, while transgenderism and transsexuality are 
used to describe behaviors or identities of people whose gender 
expression, gender identity, or both, do not necessarily conform with 
the binary sex norm or may be different from the sex assigned to 
them at birth.
15
 Not all communities use the terms “transgender” and 
“transsexual” consistently and different groups and individuals have 
strong feelings about which term they prefer.
16
 
 
 12. Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 12 
AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 161 (2000). 
 13. Id. Some experts place the number of genital anomalies at birth as 1 in 4,500. Peter A. 
Lee et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS e488 
(2006). 
 14. For a more detailed discussion of the debates regarding terminology, see GREENBERG, 
supra note 2, at 118–19; Holmes, supra note 3, at 6–7; and Alyson K. Spurgas, (Un)Queering 
Identity: The Biosocial Production of Intersex/DSD, in CRITICAL INTERSEX, supra note 3, at 97, 
97–111. 
 15. See GLAAD Media Reference Guide – Transgender Glossary of Terms, GLAAD, 
http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last updated May 2010). 
 16. One major LGBT organization, GLAAD, suggests the following definitions: 
Transgender: An umbrella term (adj.) for people whose gender identity and/or gender 
expression differs from the sex they were assigned at birth. The term may include but 
is not limited to: transsexuals, cross-dressers and other gender-variant people. 
Transgender people may identify as female-to-male (FTM) or male-to-female 
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C.  The Medical Treatment of  
People with an Intersex Condition 
Before the 1950s, infants who were born with an intersex 
condition were not subjected to any medical treatment. If a child was 
born with atypical genitalia, doctors would assign a sex to the infant 
that they believed was most appropriate and would not otherwise 
surgically or hormonally alter the child.
17
 
During the middle of the twentieth century, however, two 
developments occurred that changed the manner in which medical 
experts treated the birth of a child with an intersex condition. First, 
surgical techniques were developed that made it possible to modify 
genitalia to what was considered to be a “cosmetically acceptable” 
appearance.
18
 Second, the idea that gender identity was based upon 
nurture and not nature became the conventional wisdom. In other 
words, most doctors, sociologists, and psychologists believed that 
children were born without an innate sense of being male or 
female.
19
 They believed that gender identity would develop 
 
(MTF). . . . Transgender people may or may not decide to alter their bodies hormonally 
and/or surgically. 
Transsexual (also Transexual): An older term which originated in the medical and 
psychological communities. While some transsexual people still prefer to use the term 
to describe themselves, many transgender people prefer the term transgender to 
transsexual. Unlike transgender, transsexual is not an umbrella term, as many 
transgender people do not identify as transsexual. Id. 
The University of San Francisco Medical Center defines the terms as follows: 
Transgender: literally “across gender”; sometimes interpreted as “beyond gender”; a 
community-based term that describes a wide variety of cross-gender behaviors and 
identities. This is not a diagnostic term, and does not imply a medical or psychological 
condition. 
. . . . 
Transsexual: a medical term applied to individuals who seek hormonal (and often, but 
not always) surgical treatment to modify their bodies so they may live full time as 
members of the sex category opposite to their birth-assigned sex (including legal 
status). Some individuals who have completed their medical transition prefer not to use 
this term as a self-referent. Ctr. of Excellence for Transgender Health, Transgender 
Terminology, UNIV. OF CAL., S.F., http://www.transhealth.ucsf.edu/trans?page= 
protocol-terminology (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
 17. Alice Domurat Dreger, A History of Intersexuality: From the Age of Gonads to the Age 
of Consent, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 345, 345–49 (1998) [hereinafter A History]. 
 18. Alice Domurat Dreger, “Ambiguous Sex”—or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues in 
the Treatment of Intersexuality, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 1998, at 24, 28 [hereinafter 
Ambivalent Medicine]. 
 19. Id. at 27–28. 
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consistently with the appearance of the child’s genitalia and the 
gender role in which the child was raised.
20
 
Beginning in the 1950s, the standard protocol for treating 
newborns with ambiguous genitalia involved surgical alteration of 
“unacceptable” genitalia into “normal” genitalia.
21
 “Normal” 
genitalia for boys required an “adequate” penis.
22
 If doctors believed 
that an XY infant had an “adequate” penis, the child would be raised 
as a boy.
23
 A child without an “adequate” penis would be surgically 
altered and raised as a girl.
24
 The penis became the essential 
determinant of sex because medical experts believed that a male 
could only be a true man if he possessed a penis that was capable of 
penetrating a vagina and allowed him to urinate in a standing 
position.
25
 
Medical technology at this time was capable of creating an 
adequate vagina (defined as one that was capable of being penetrated 
by an adequate penis), but the technology was not advanced enough 
to create a fully functional penis (one that was capable of penetrating 
a vagina). Therefore, surgeons would typically recommend to parents 
that their XY infants with smaller penises or infants with other 
genital ambiguities be raised as girls after the doctors surgically and 
hormonally feminized them.
26
 
Under this protocol, some XY infants were surgically and 
hormonally altered and raised as girls because of the dominant belief 
that growing up as a boy with an “inadequate” penis was too 
psychologically traumatic to risk.
27
 Some of these XY infants had 
fully functional testicles, and were therefore capable of reproducing. 
Doctors would destroy their reproductive capacity rather than 
 
 20. Id.; John G. Hampson et al., Hermaphroditism: Recommendations Concerning Case 
Management, 16 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 547 (1956); John Money et al., 
An Examination of Some Basic Sexual Concepts: The Evidence of Human Hermaphroditism, 97 
BULL. JOHN HOPKINS HOSP. 301 (1955). 
 21. Use of the terms “normal,” “adequate,” and “acceptable” genitalia in this Article reflect 
the language used in the medical literature. The Author believes that the atypical genitalia 
referred to in the literature are differences or variations and should not be labeled with the 
normative terms “normal,” “adequate,” and “acceptable.” 
 22. Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 27–28. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 29. 
 26. SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED 19 (1998). 
 27. See Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 27. 
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recommending that they be raised with a penis that was considered 
smaller than the norm.
28
 
XX infants with a phallus that appeared to be more similar in 
length to a penis than a clitoris were treated differently. Instead of 
recommending that these children be raised as boys, doctors would 
surgically remove the clitoris or reduce it to a size that they 
considered acceptable,
29
 even if the surgery might diminish or 
destroy the person’s ability to engage in satisfactory sex.
30
 
The dominant protocol practiced during most of the last sixty 
years was based on three interrelated sex and gender stereotypes. 
First, heteronormativity dominated the equation. When determining 
whether a child would be happier as a boy or a girl, doctors 
considered the child’s capacity for engaging in traditional 
heterosexual intercourse in adulthood.
31
 Doctors presumed that all 
boys required a penis capable of being inserted in a vagina and all 
girls required a vagina capable of accommodating a penis. They 
operated on the assumption that everyone would want to engage in 
heterosexual sexual relationships.
32
 
Second, gender stereotypes about the importance to females of 
physical appearance compared to sexual satisfaction also affected the 
treatment decision.
33
 Doctors would remove a girl’s clitoris if they 
decided the clitoris was too large.
34
 Doctors performed these 
surgeries even though they often impaired the girl’s ability to engage 
in satisfactory sex. 
Finally, medical treatment decisions were dominated by 
stereotypical presumptions about what doctors believed would be 
important to males and females. Health care providers presumed that 
males would prioritize the size of their penis over reproductive 
 
 28. See id. at 28. 
 29. L.H. Braga & J.L. Pippi Salle, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia: A Critical Appraisal of 
the Evolution of Feminizing Genitoplasty and the Controversies Surrounding Gender 
Reassignment, 19 EUR. J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 203, 204 (2009). Until the 1970s, doctors would 
amputate the entire clitoris based on the belief that the clitoris was not necessary for normal 
sexual function. Id. 
 30. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 5, at 59–61. 
 31. Id.; A History, supra note 17, at 349. 
 32. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 5, at 58–59. 
 33. Id. 
 34. A clitoris is considered acceptable if it is less than one centimeter in length. Phalluses 
between 1 and 2.5–3 centimeters are considered unacceptable and are surgically altered under 
current medical practices. Id. at 59. 
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capabilities. Therefore, doctors would surgically and hormonally 
feminize XY infants who may have been able to reproduce
35
 rather 
than allow the children to grow up as boys with what doctors 
believed was an inadequate phallus. The focus for females was 
different. Doctors assumed that females would prioritize the ability 
to procreate even if they could not fully enjoy the act that leads to 
procreation.
36
 Therefore, doctors would retain reproductive capacity 
for XX infants who were capable of conceiving and giving birth but 
surgically remove or reduce the size of the clitoris, which often 
diminished or destroyed a female’s ability to enjoy sexual acts.
37
 
Because infants with an intersex condition were considered 
“abnormal,” their births were typically shrouded in shame and 
secrecy.
38
 Doctors often told parents half-truths about their children’s 
condition.
39
 Parents were also encouraged to lie to their children 
about the nature of their condition.
40
 The children were viewed as 
“freaks”; their conditions were to be studied by physicians and 
hidden from society.
41
 
During the 1990s, a number of people began to question the 
premises underlying the dominant treatment protocol for infants born 
with “ambiguous” genitalia.
42
 Many authorities, including experts in 
a variety of disciplines and intersex activist organizations, started to 
challenge the standard medical practices for three reasons. 
• They asserted that the dominant protocol, which was 
based upon half-truths and secrecy, led to psychological 
trauma because it exacerbated a person’s sense of shame 
by reinforcing cultural norms of sexual abnormality. 
People with an intersex condition who were subjected to 
the standard treatment protocol perceived the practices as 
 
 35. Some of these males would have required Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) to 
reproduce. 
 36. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 5, at 59; Bruce E. Wilson & William G. Reiner, 
Management of Intersex: A Shifting Paradigm, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 360, 363–64 (1998). 
 37. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 5, at 59. 
 38. See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 26, at 97; Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 27. 
 39. See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 26, at 97; Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 27–28. 
 40. See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 26, at 95–96; Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 27. 
 41. See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 26, at 95; Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 31. 
 42. For an excellent overview of the harm caused by the traditional treatment protocol, see 
Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 
21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 64–74 (2006). 
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a sexual violation leading to a profound loss of their 
autonomy and extreme humiliation. 
• They argued that gender identity could not be 
manipulated by surgical and hormonal alteration. 
Therefore, they contended that these interventions could 
lead to irreversible harm if the child’s gender identity did 
not develop in conformity with the surgically altered 
genitalia. 
• They asserted that in cases where the gender assignment 
was not controversial, cosmetic genital surgeries caused 
more physical and psychological trauma than allowing 
the children to grow up with atypical genitalia. Many 
adults with an intersex condition who had been subjected 
to cosmetic genital surgery maintained that it often 
caused a loss or diminishment of erotic response, genital 
pain or discomfort, infections, scarring, urinary 
incontinence, and cosmetically unacceptable genitalia.
43
 
Based upon these concerns, many experts began to call for either 
a moratorium or a severe limitation on the practice of surgically 
altering infants with an intersex condition. They asserted that the 
standard medical protocol should be modified in three ways. First, 
they encouraged more honesty and openness about the treatment of 
intersexuality to diminish the stigma and psychological trauma 
experienced by people with an intersex condition and their family 
members. Second, they called for an end to surgeries that feminized 
XY infants on the flawed assumption that gender identity is 
malleable. Third, they asserted that cosmetic genital surgeries that 
often cause pain, scarring, incontinence, sexual dysfunction, and 
other physical and psychological trauma could only be performed 
 
 43. Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: 
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia, 7 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 55 (2000); Justine M. Schober, Feminizing Genitoplasty for Intersex, in 
PEDIATRIC SURGERY AND UROLOGY: LONG TERM OUTCOMES 549, 556–57 (Mark D. Stringer et 
al., eds., 1998); A History, supra note 17, at 352; Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Sex 
Reassignment at Birth: A Long Term Review and Clinical Implications, 151 ARCHIVES 
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 298 (1997); William Reiner, To Be Male or Female—That Is 
the Question, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 224 (1997); KESSLER, supra 
note 26; Milton Diamond, Pediatric Management of Ambiguous and Traumatized Genitalia, 162 
J. UROLOGY 1021 (1999); Kenneth I. Glassberg, Gender Assignment and the Pediatric Urologist, 
161 J. UROLOGY 1309 (1999); Cheryl Chase, Surgical Progress Is Not the Answer to 
Intersexuality, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 385, 389–91 (1998). 
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with the informed consent of the person undergoing the treatment. In 
other words, they argued that parents should not have the power to 
consent to these potentially traumatic surgeries.
44
 
Advocates calling for these changes have been extremely 
successful in accomplishing the first goal. The intersex movement 
has been very effective in educating the medical community about 
the harm of telling parents half-truths and lying to children. In 2006, 
leading experts from a variety of disciplines published a “Consensus 
Statement on the Management of Intersex Disorders” (“the 2006 
Consensus Statement”).
45
 The 2006 Consensus Statement 
emphasizes the importance of open communication and participatory 
decision making. It encourages the use of a multidisciplinary 
treatment team—including psychologists, psychiatrists, social 
workers, and ethicists—who can adequately address the emotional 
aspects of the parents’ decision-making process. It also urges treating 
physicians to emphasize that intersexuality is not shameful and that 
children have the potential to become well-adjusted adults.
46
 
Intersex advocates have experienced some success in 
accomplishing their second goal. XY infants with an “inadequate” 
penis are no longer automatically surgically altered and raised as 
girls. Some doctors have been persuaded to limit the number of 
feminization surgeries on XY infants. The 2006 Consensus 
Statement recommends that physicians carefully consider a number 
of factors before assigning a gender to a newborn with an intersex 
condition. These factors include: the etiology of the intersex 
condition, genital appearance, surgical options, the need for life-long 
hormone replacement therapy, the potential for fertility, the views of 
the family, and sometimes, the circumstances relating to cultural 
practices.
47
 The 2006 Consensus Statement recognizes that children 
are born with an innate sense of gender that cannot be manipulated 
by surgery and hormones.
48
 The 2006 Consensus Statement also 
acknowledges that any type of surgical alteration of the genitalia may 
 
 44. Supra note 43. 
 45. See Lee et al., supra note 13. 
 46. Id. at e490. 
 47. Id. at e491. 
 48. Id. at e492–93. 
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be problematic because between 5 and 25 percent of people with a 
DSD will ultimately reject the assigned gender.
49
 
The intersex movement has not been as successful at 
accomplishing its third goal: curtailing cosmetic genital surgeries 
designed to conform a child’s genitalia to a binary sex norm.
50
 If a 
child with an intersex condition is going to be raised as a girl, many 
physicians will reduce the size of her clitoris if they believe it is too 
large.
51
 If a child with an intersex condition is going to be raised as a 
boy and the urethral opening appears someplace on the shaft rather 
than on the tip of the penis, doctors typically perform surgeries to 
modify the penis.
52
 
II.  THE INTERSEX MOVEMENT’S MAJOR GOAL:  
RETURNING CONTROL OF THEIR BODIES 
 TO PEOPLE WITH AN INTERSEX CONDITION 
Many medical experts and people with an intersex condition 
believe that a moratorium should be imposed on all cosmetic genital 
surgeries that are being performed without the express informed 
consent of the person undergoing the treatment.
53
 In other words, 
they believe that parents should not have the authority to consent to 
these surgeries on behalf of their children. Instead, they assert that 
these surgeries should be delayed until the children reach the age 
when they have the capacity to determine for themselves whether to 
undergo any type of medical treatment.
54
 
 
 49. Id. at e491–92. The rejection of the assigned gender varies with the type of DSD. For 
example, more than 90 percent of people with 46,XX congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) and 
all people with 46,XY complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS) assigned female in 
infancy develop a female gender identity. Id. Approximately 60 percent of people with 5-alpha-
reductase deficiency who were assigned female in infancy and who virilize at puberty end up 
living as males. Id. Twenty-five percent of the individuals with partial androgen insensitivity 
syndrome (PAIS), androgen biosynthetic defects, and incomplete gonadal dysgenesis, are 
dissatisfied with their sex of rearing, whether they were raised as males or females. Id. 
 50. See discussion infra notes 165–199 and accompanying text. 
 51. See discussion infra notes 165–169 and accompanying text. 
 52. See discussion infra notes 194–199 and accompanying text. 
 53. Supra note 43. 
 54. Supra note 43. Surgical interventions are not the only technique doctors have relied on to 
produce “acceptable” genitalia. Some doctors have also experimented with other methods of 
altering the appearance of the genitalia of infants with an intersex condition. See, e.g., Saroj 
Nimkarn & Maria New, Prenatal Diagnosis and Treatment of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, 
67 HORMONE RES. 53 (2007). Instead of performing surgery after the child is born, some doctors 
administer drugs to pregnant mothers who may be carrying a child with one type of intersex 
condition, 21-hydroxylase deficiency congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), an adrenal disorder 
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Those supporting a moratorium on cosmetic genital surgeries on 
infants with a DSD believe that parents should not be given the 
authority to consent to these surgeries performed on their infants 
because: 
• they are not medically necessary; 
• they can interfere with sexual satisfaction; 
• they frequently result in severe scarring and pain; 
• multiple invasive surgeries are often required; 
• children who undergo these surgeries often suffer from 
stigma and trauma from being treated as abnormal and in 
need of fixing; 
• medically unnecessary surgery should not be used to 
relieve the anxiety of the parents for their intersex child; 
and 
• the children’s sense of autonomy may be harmed when 
they are old enough to understand the procedures and 
their consequences.
55
 
Recent studies support these assertions. In 2001, a group of 
experts published a study in the respected British medical journal 
The Lancet of forty-four adolescent patients, all of whom had 
undergone surgery in infancy between 1979 and 1995.
56
 These 
experts concluded that medically unnecessary cosmetic surgeries 
should be delayed until a child is old enough to make the decision.
57
 
Another publication from the United Kingdom concluded from a 
study of fourteen patients with CAH that the results of early surgery 
were disappointing and recommended that surgery generally be 
delayed until after puberty.
58
 In 2011, a group of German physicians 
also agreed with this assessment and recommended that genital 
surgery generally be performed in adolescence and only with the 
 
that can lead to the formation of atypical genitalia. Id. See infra notes 170–83 and accompanying 
text for a more detailed discussion of this treatment protocol. 
 55. See Julie A. Greenberg, Legal Aspects of Gender Assignment, 13 ENDOCRINOLOGIST 
277, 279–84 (2003); Tamar-Mattis, supra note 42. 
 56. Sarah M. Creighton et al., Objective Cosmetic and Anatomical Outcomes at Adolescence 
of Feminising Surgery for Ambiguous Genitalia Done in Childhood, 358 LANCET 124, 124 
(2001). 
 57. Id. at 124–25. 
 58. N.K. Alizai et al., Feminizing Genitoplasty for Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia: What 
Happens at Puberty?, 161 J. UROLOGY 1588, 1589 (1999). 
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informed consent of the person undergoing the procedure.
59
 They 
based their recommendation on the high dissatisfaction rates 
expressed by people with a DSD in the surgical result, clitoral 
arousal, and overall sex life.
60
 
In 2004, the Hastings Center, a well-respected nonpartisan 
organization that studies ethical standards in health and medicine, 
convened a multidisciplinary group to consider the medical, 
psychosocial, and ethical issues associated with the care of children 
born with atypical genitalia. This group of experts concluded that it 
is unethical to perform surgery to normalize the appearance of 
people’s genitalia without the informed consent of the patients (the 
children).
61
 They determined that parental consent was not adequate 
to protect the child’s interests.
62
 They acknowledged that some 
surgeons maintain that technical considerations warrant some early 
surgeries, but they concluded that the irrevocable nature of the 
surgery warranted extreme caution and questioned whether surgical 
expediency could ever outweigh the psychosocial and ethical 
considerations for waiting until children reach the age when they can 
meaningfully participate in the decision.
63
 
The 2006 Consensus Statement provides the most thorough 
analysis of the current treatment protocols for children with an 
intersex condition. It encourages physicians to adopt a more cautious 
approach before undertaking surgical intervention. It suggests that 
clitoral reduction be limited to cases of severe genital virilization (the 
development of male sex characteristics in a female) and should not 
be performed on all clitorises that are larger than the norm.
64
 It 
emphasizes that the focus of such surgeries should be on functional 
outcome (orgasmic function and erectile sensation) rather than on 
cosmetic appearance.
65
 It also acknowledges that absolutely no 
evidence exists to support the long-standing assumption that genital 
 
 59. Birgit Kohler et al., Satisfaction with Genital Surgery and Sexual Life of Adults with XY 
Disorders of Sex Development: Results from the German Clinical Evaluation Study, 97 
J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 1441 (2011). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Joel Frader et al., Health Care Professionals and Intersex Conditions, 158 ARCHIVES 
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 426, 427–28 (2004). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Lee et al., supra note 13, at e491. 
 65. Id. 
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surgery carried out for cosmetic purposes during the first year of life 
relieves parental distress or improves the parent-child bond.
66
 
The 2006 Consensus Statement and its recommended guidelines 
have been applauded by many and endorsed by the American 
Academy of Pediatrics.
67
 The 2006 Consensus Statement, however, 
fails to resolve the remaining vital issue: should medically 
unnecessary cosmetic infant genital surgery ever be performed? 
Some have criticized the 2006 Consensus Statement for supporting 
surgery in cases of severe virilization even though current studies do 
not support the conclusion that current surgical techniques preserve 
sensation.
68
 Others have supported the 2006 Consensus Statement’s 
affirmation of the parents’ right to consent to genital surgery.
69
 No 
studies, however, have examined the effect that the 2006 Consensus 
Statement has had on current practices. 
III.  POTENTIAL APPROACHES TO 
 ENHANCING THE AUTONOMY OF  
PEOPLE WITH AN INTERSEX CONDITION 
People calling for a moratorium on cosmetic genital surgeries 
being performed on infants with an intersex condition believe that 
parents should not have the legal authority to consent to these 
surgeries. No one questions whether the parents making these 
decisions are motivated by love and a genuine desire to help their 
children. Those who support a moratorium are concerned, however, 
that parents may not be able to completely comprehend what might 
be in their children’s long-term best interests. They emphasize that 
parents should be provided complete information about their 
children’s conditions and offered appropriate professional counseling 
and peer support. They assert that medical treatment should be 
limited to conditions that pose an actual physical health risk. They 
believe that only the affected children, when they are old enough to 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at e492; Section on Endocrinology Policy, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, http:// 
www2.aap.org/sections/endocrinology/endopolicy.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 68. Katrina A. Karkazis, Early Genital Surgery to Remain Controversial, 118 PEDIATRICS 
814, 814 (2006). 
 69. Id. 
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appropriately assess the risks and benefits, should have the power to 
decide whether they want to undergo cosmetic surgery.
70
 
Most doctors, however, oppose a moratorium on infant genital 
cosmetic surgeries and believe that surgical alteration is in the best 
interests of a child born with an intersex condition. They are 
concerned that an untreated child may suffer psychological trauma 
from growing up with atypical-appearing genitalia. They believe this 
potential risk of psychological harm is more detrimental than are the 
potential risks of surgery. They assert that parents should continue to 
be allowed to consent to these surgeries because they are in the best 
position to determine what treatment would be in their child’s best 
interests.
71
 This group believes that parents who are fully educated 
about all the risks and benefits of the different protocols should have 
the authority to determine what is in the best interests of their child.
72
 
A significant minority of parents now decline or postpone 
surgery on their children with atypical genitalia. According to one 
comprehensive study published in 2007, however, most parents still 
choose to consent to genitoplasty on behalf of their infants.
73
 
Adults with an intersex condition also disagree about whether 
parents should have the ability to consent to these surgeries during 
their child’s infancy. One study, published in 2004, surveyed 
seventy-two patients with an intersex condition and XY 
 
 70. See e.g., Beh & Diamond, supra note 43; Chase, supra note 43, at 385; Diamond & 
Sigmundson, supra note 43; Kenneth Kipnis & Milton Diamond, Pediatric Ethics in the Surgical 
Assignment of Sex, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 398, 406 (1998); Alyssa Connell Lareau, Who Decides? 
Gender Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 92 GEO. L.J. 129 (2000); Tamar-Mattis, 
supra note 42; Bruce E. Wilson & William G. Reiner, Management of Intersex: A Shifting 
Paradigm, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 360 (1998). 
 71. KATRINA KARKAZIS, FIXING SEX: INTERSEX, MEDICAL AUTHORITY, AND LIVED 
EXPERIENCE 134–35 (2008); see also Claudia Wiesemann et al., Ethical Principles and 
Recommendations for the Medical Management of Differences of Sex Development 
(DSD)/Intersex in Children and Adolescents, 169 EUR. J. PEDIATRICS 671, 674–76 (2009) 
(discussing ethical principles and guidelines for the medical treatment of infants with a DSD). 
 72. See, e.g., S. F. Ahmed et al., Intersex and Gender Assignment: The Third Way?, 89 
ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 847 (2004); Robert M. Blizzard, Intersex Issues: A Series of 
Continuing Conundrums, 110 PEDIATRICS 616 (2002); J. Daaboul & J. Frader, Ethics and the 
Management of the Patient with Intersex: A Middle Way, 14 J. PEDIATRIC ENDOCRINOLOGY & 
METABOLISM 1575 (2001); Wiesemann et al., supra note 71. 
 73. Melissa Parisi et al., A Gender Assessment Team: Experience with 250 Patients over a 
Period of 25 Years, 9 GENETICS MED. 348 (2007); see also, KARKAZIS, supra note 71, at 134–35 
(concluding, after conducting interviews with parents and visiting Web site support groups, that a 
fair number of parents continue to choose genital surgery for their children). 
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chromosomes.
74
 Some of the surveyed patients had been raised as 
males and others had been raised as females. Not all had been 
subjected to surgery as infants, and those who had been surgically 
altered had undergone a variety of surgical interventions. Opinions 
about the appropriate timing for genital surgery varied. Forty-six 
percent believed that surgery should not be performed before 
adolescence, and an additional 4 percent believed surgery should not 
be performed before a child reached elementary school age.
75
 Forty-
nine percent supported surgery during infancy or toddlerhood.
76
 In 
other words, almost one-half of the people interviewed supported 
delaying surgery until adolescence or adulthood when the person 
undergoing the procedure can meaningfully participate in the 
decision-making process. The authors of the study recognized that 
their sample size was small and may not have been representative. 
They called for those who are in a position to control the guidelines 
for treatment of infants with an intersex condition to obtain 
additional data to determine the optimal treatment protocol.
77
 
Until comprehensive retrospective studies are conducted that 
clearly establish whether surgical alteration of an infant with an 
intersex condition is beneficial, these interventions will continue to 
be controversial. Given the critical interests at stake and the 
polarized nature of the debate, legal institutions will likely be 
brought into the dispute. Legislatures may be asked to enact statutes 
and, in the absence of legislative action, courts may be asked to 
intervene. Thus far, no country or state has enacted controlling 
legislation
78
 and Colombia is the only jurisdiction in which the 
highest court has rendered an opinion on this issue. Therefore, if 
courts are asked to resolve the legal, medical, and ethical issues 
 
 74. H.F.L. Meyer-Bahlburg et al., Attitudes of Adult 46, XY Intersex Persons to Clinical 
Management Policies, 171 J. UROLOGY 1615, 1615 (2004). 
 75. Id. at 1617. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1618. 
 78. South Africa considered adopting legislation. See Legislation Mooted to Regulate 
Intersex Surgery, ANC DAILY NEWS BRIEFING (Nov. 30, 2004), http://www.e-tools.co.za/news 
brief/2004/news1201.txt. The city of San Francisco also held hearings on this issue and issued a 
report condemning current practices. See S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N OF THE CITY & CNTY. OF 
S.F., A HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION INTO THE MEDICAL “NORMALIZATION” OF INTERSEX 
PEOPLE 4 (2005), available at http://www.sf-hrc.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/sfhumanrights/Committee_ 
Meetings/Lesbian_Gay_Bisexual_Transgender/SFHRC%20Intersex%20Report(1).pdf. 
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surrounding consent to the treatment of children born with an 
intersex condition, the outcome is far from clear. 
Courts or legislatures could modify current practices to ensure 
that people with an intersex condition have their right to autonomy 
and decision-making power over health care decisions affecting them 
respected. Legal institutions could ban these procedures unless they 
are performed with the informed consent of the person undergoing 
the procedure. Alternatively, they could allow the procedures to 
continue but mandate oversight by a court and/or a hospital ethics 
board. Finally, they could impose enhanced informed consent 
procedures.
79
 
A.  The Informed Consent Doctrine 
The most likely legal doctrine that will be used to challenge the 
current medical treatment protocol for infants with an intersex 
condition is the doctrine of informed consent. The informed consent 
doctrine protects an individual’s right to bodily integrity and self-
determination and respects patients’ rights to autonomous decision 
making. The informed consent doctrine requires that doctors (1) fully 
inform their patients about all material risks associated with any 
proposed medical treatment; and (2) receive the patient’s consent to 
the procedure. The principle of autonomy requires deference to a 
patient’s treatment choices unless the government has a compelling 
interest that justifies overriding a competent person’s right to 
autonomy. Courts rarely find such an overriding state interest. 
The informed consent doctrine is premised on the patient’s 
ability to understand and weigh the risks and benefits of the 
suggested procedure. Sometimes patients are unable to reach an 
informed decision because they are too young or they suffer from a 
disabling condition that precludes them from understanding the 
advantages and disadvantages of a procedure. In these cases, 
informed permission is required from a surrogate, typically the 
minor’s (or incompetent’s) parent(s) or guardian(s).
80
 
Parents’ decisions on behalf of their children are generally 
accorded great deference for two reasons. First, legal institutions 
 
 79. For the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches, see GREENBERG, supra 
note 2, at 35–43. 
 80. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, 
and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 314 (1995). 
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presume that parents will make decisions that are in the best interests 
of their children.
81
 Second, the Constitution protects family privacy 
and parental authority.
82
 Therefore, courts rarely become involved in 
parental medical decisions,
83
 as long as the parents and the 
physicians agree on the treatment.
84
 
Typically, parents are allowed to consent to medical treatment 
for their minor children, even if the treatment involves a significant 
risk of harm. Parents can consent to inoculations, complex surgeries, 
experimental treatments, radiation, chemotherapy, and other 
potentially harmful procedures. The law presumes that parents will 
weigh the potential benefits and risks of each procedure and make 
decisions that are in the best interest of their children.
85
 
In some circumstances, however, courts and legislatures have 
determined that complete deference to parental decisions may not be 
in a child’s best interests. If the potential gravity of the consequences 
of the medical treatment is particularly severe and the situation 
involves potentially conflicting interests, courts may carefully review 
parents’ consent to the treatment of their child. The classic cases 
requiring close scrutiny involve (1) terminating the life of a child in a 
persistent vegetative state; (2) authorizing an organ donation to 
benefit another family member (typically a sibling of the 
 
 81. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (involving decisions by parents to 
institutionalize their children with a psychiatric condition). 
 82. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 660, 667 (2000) (involving the right of a 
parent to determine visitation by grandparents); Parham, 442 U.S. at 604. 
 83. Courts have intervened when they believe the parents are not capable of reaching a well-
reasoned decision that would be in the child’s best interests. See, e.g., A.D.H. v. State Dep’t of 
Human Res., 640 So. 2d 969 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (ordering appropriate HIV treatment over the 
mother’s objection when the mother adamantly denied that her child was infected with HIV). 
 84. Beh & Diamond, supra note 43, at 39. Litigation regarding parental consent may occur 
when parents refuse to agree to a medically recommended procedure. These cases typically arise 
when a doctor suggests a potentially life-saving treatment for a child and the parents refuse to 
consent because the procedure violates the parents’ religious beliefs. See, e.g., In re Petra B., 265 
Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1989) (ordering treatment of a minor’s serious burns over the objections 
of the parents, who wanted to treat the burns with herbal remedies for religious reasons). These 
cases involve unique issues involving the First Amendment. Cases involving infants with an 
intersex condition are not analogous to the religious-refusal cases for two reasons. First, in the 
cases involving an infant with an intersex condition, doctors and parents agree about the desired 
treatment, but in the religious-refusal cases, the doctor is recommending a procedure that the 
parent is refusing. Second, the parental decision in the intersex cases is not based on religious 
practices and therefore does not involve First Amendment issues. 
 85. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 43, at 39. 
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incompetent child); and (3) approving the involuntary sterilization of 
a minor or incompetent adult.
86
 
In these cases, courts do not simply defer to the parents. Instead, 
they require judicial oversight of these procedures for three reasons. 
First, these choices potentially infringe on the children’s 
constitutionally protected rights, including the right to life and the 
right to reproductive choice. Second, they involve a significant risk 
of harm to the children. Finally, parents may be in a position in 
which it is difficult for them to separate their child’s interests from 
their own interests. For example, in the organ-donation cases, parents 
are making a decision that may save the life of one child who 
requires a kidney transplant and at the same time expose their other 
child, the kidney donor, to a serious risk of harm. Similarly, in 
involuntary-sterilization cases, parents may want to spare their child 
from the difficulties of bearing and rearing a child, but they may also 
be motivated by their concern about having to care for a grandchild, 
should their incompetent child become pregnant or father a child. 
Therefore, courts will carefully scrutinize these decisions to ensure 
that the child’s constitutional rights are protected and that the 
decision is in the best interests of the child.
87
 
In addition to termination of life, organ donation, and 
sterilization procedures, some jurisdictions have ruled that other 
invasive procedures—including involuntary psychosurgery, 
electroconvulsive therapy, and administration of antipsychotic 
medications—are life-altering treatments that require additional 
measures to protect the child’s rights.
88
 Recently, the Washington 
Protection and Advocacy System (WPAS), a federally funded 
watchdog agency charged with investigating discriminatory 
treatment of people with a disability, investigated a case involving 
the administration of growth-attenuating hormones and the removal 
of the uterus and breast-bud tissue from a developmentally disabled 
 
 86. See Jennifer Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should 
Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 
45–46 (2000). 
 87. See, e.g., In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. 1990); Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). 
 88. See DAVID R. CARLSON & DEBORAH A. DORFMAN, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 
REGARDING THE “ASHLEY TREATMENT” 17–18 (2007), available at http://www.disabilityrights 
wa.org/home/Full_Report_InvestigativeReportRegardingtheAshleyTreatment.pdf. 
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child. The WPAS determined that these types of procedures, because 
they were invasive and irreversible, also required court supervision.
89
 
B.  The Informed Consent Doctrine Applied to  
Surgeries Performed on Infants with an Intersex Condition 
Allowing parents to consent to cosmetic genital surgery on an 
infant with an intersex condition involves similarly complex issues. 
Currently, parents can consent to these surgeries, and these 
procedures are not subjected to any external oversight or approval. 
Based on the important interests at stake, courts or legislatures could 
be convinced to place stricter limitations on the circumstances under 
which these procedures can be performed. The extent of the 
regulation would depend on many factors. The most important 
consideration would be whether the procedure affects a 
constitutionally protected right. 
1.  Procedures That Result in Sterilization Affect a Constitutionally 
Protected Right and Should Require Court Approval 
Medical procedures that result in sterilization affect the 
constitutionally protected right to reproduce and require strict 
oversight. In 1942, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,
90
 the Supreme Court 
began to impose strict restrictions on sterilization practices. The 
Court ruled that procreative choice is a fundamental human right 
protected by the U.S. Constitution.
91
 Thus, the Court limited the 
circumstances under which states could sterilize people without their 
consent.
92
 
After Skinner, some states adopted statutes regulating 
sterilization practices to ensure that a person’s reproductive capacity 
would not be terminated inappropriately. These regulations typically 
 
 89. Id. at 22. WPAS is now called Disability Rights Washington. For a more detailed 
discussion see infra notes 100–01 and 210–20 and accompanying text. 
 90. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 91. Id. at 541. 
 92. Skinner involved an Oklahoma statute that allowed the government to sterilize habitual 
criminals. Id. at 536. A constitutional claim based on the fundamental right to reproductive 
freedom must be based on a governmental act and not based on the actions of private individuals. 
See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974). Therefore, a doctor who is not 
employed by the state or a parent could not be held liable for violating a child’s constitutionally 
protected right to reproduction. Because reproduction is considered a fundamental right, however, 
a number of states have limited the ability of private actors to engage in actions that affect 
reproductive freedom. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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require judicial oversight and approval of sterilizations performed on 
people who are not capable of consenting to the procedure 
themselves. Full protection of reproductive rights requires that a 
court approve an involuntary sterilization before it is performed. 
During the judicial hearing, the child who will be subjected to 
sterilization must have a separate legal representative who advocates 
zealously on the child’s behalf.
93
 
Court approval is clearly required when the sole purpose of the 
procedure is sterilization. If the main reason for the medical 
treatment is something other than sterilization (e.g., removal of a 
cancerous growth) and sterilization is a byproduct, many doctors and 
attorneys believe that they can proceed without court approval.
94
 The 
WPAS, however, has concluded that all sterilizations of 
developmentally disabled individuals, regardless of the primary 
motivation for the procedures, require court approval.
95
 
Reproductive rights are compromised in a number of medical 
procedures performed on infants with an intersex condition. A 
number of current medical practices have the potential to destroy 
reproductive capacity. For example, doctors will remove the female 
reproductive organs of children with congenital adrenal hyperplasia 
who are going to be raised as males, thus destroying their ability to 
reproduce. In addition, doctors will remove the testicles of infants 
with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome, which could 
potentially affect the children’s future reproductive capacity.
96
 
Finally, although the practice is no longer supported in the medical 
literature, anecdotal evidence indicates that some doctors may still 
recommend raising XY children with an “inadequate” penis as 
 
 93. States that have adopted legislation controlling the sterilization of people who are not 
competent to consent include Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-10.5-128 to -131 (1997); 
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-691 to -700 (1997); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, 
§§ 7001–7016 (1998)); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.205–.335 (1995); and Vermont, VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8705–8716 (1987). In states that do not have controlling legislation, courts 
have ruled that these procedures cannot be performed without a court order. See, e.g., In re 
Romero, 790 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1990); Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. 1994); In re 
Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wa. 1980). 
 94. See CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 88. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Current technology does not exist that would allow women with CAIS to reproduce. 
Presently, the gonads cannot produce sperm that could be used for reproduction. It is possible, 
however, that future technology could allow for reproductive ability. When doctors make their 
recommendations, the potential for reproduction should be considered. 
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female. If the parents agree in these cases, the doctors will remove 
the testicles and eliminate reproductive capacity. 
Although the sterilization statutes and cases have considered 
only children with developmental disabilities, the principles relied on 
and the rules adopted in these actions should apply with equal force 
to prohibit the sterilization of children with an intersex condition.
97
 
In fact, sterilizations of infants born with an intersex condition could 
be considered less justifiable than are sterilizations of profoundly 
disabled children. When infants with an intersex condition mature, 
they will be able to provide their informed consent to a procedure, 
whereas profoundly disabled children will never be in a position to 
provide informed consent. Thus, the justification for sterilizing 
infants with an intersex condition is even less defensible. 
Sterilizations of infants with a DSD will eventually be reviewed 
by courts. First, doctors or hospitals who are concerned about 
potential liability may seek court approval before they proceed with 
interventions that involve sterilization.
98
 In addition, people who 
have had their reproductive ability terminated without their consent 
may initiate lawsuits. Finally, governmental agencies could initiate 
investigations into these practices. When these lawsuits arise, courts 
should ban these types of procedures unless there is clear evidence 
that the sterilization would be in the child’s best interests. 
2.  Because of Their Invasive and Irreversible Nature,  
Cosmetic Genital Surgeries Not Causing Sterilization  
Should Be Subjected to Heightened Scrutiny 
Procedures that do not affect reproductive capacity do not 
involve the same fundamental rights as the sterilization cases. As a 
result, these procedures are not entitled to the same constitutional 
protection. Generally, parents’ rights to make medical decisions on 
 
 97. In an unpublished opinion, a doctor was held liable for removing gonads and rendering a 
minor infertile when he proceeded without the consent of the minor or her parents. See, e.g., 
Before the Minnesota Board of Medical Practice Stipulation and Order in the Matter of the 
Medical License of Michael H. Wipf, M.D., Date of Birth 1/31/1953, License Number 28,237 (on 
file with author). 
 98. See, e.g., Case I Part I (Sentencia SU-337/99), INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM. (May 12, 
1999), http://www.isna.org/node/166 [hereinafter Sentencia SU-337/99, Pt. I]; infra note 105. 
Doctors were responsible for initiating this case, which eventually resulted in the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia imposing safeguards to protect infants born with an intersex condition. The 
Colombian doctors were concerned that they might be held liable for performing cosmetic genital 
surgery, so they told the parents that they would not proceed without a court order. 
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behalf of their minor children are respected. Typically, if parents 
consent to a medically recommended procedure, their decision is not 
subject to any type of review.
99
 
Not all parental decisions, however, are granted automatic 
deference. Although legal authority is sparse, some disability 
organizations have asserted that judicial approval is required for 
parental consent in cases involving invasive and irreversible 
procedures other than sterilization. For example, in a recent 
investigation involving the removal of the uterus and breast-bud 
tissue of a developmentally disabled child and the administration of 
hormones to her, the WPAS determined that these types of 
procedures should only be undertaken with court supervision.
100
 In 
its extensive report, the WPAS stated, 
[T]he rights of parents to make treatment and other 
decisions for their minor children, however, are not 
unfettered. “[T]he state has a wide range of power for 
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting 
the child’s welfare.” [Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 167 (1944).] Parents generally have the right to make 
medical decisions for their minor children and provide 
informed consent for various procedures; however, courts 
have limited this authority when parents seek highly 
invasive and/or irreversible medical treatment of their 
minor children. [Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 585 (1979).] 
Courts and the Washington State Legislature, for example, 
have held that parents do not have the authority to consent 
to medical treatment in cases involving involuntary 
inpatient psychiatric care, [Id. at 584; State ex rel. T.B. v. 
CPC Fairfax Hosp., 918 P.2d 497, 503–04 (Wash. 1996);] 
the administration of electro convulsive therapy in non-
emergency life-saving situations, [In re A.M.P., 708 N.E.2d 
1235, 1240–1241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 71.34.355(9) (2009);] psychosurgery, [Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 71.34.355(10) (2009);] abortions for mature minors, 
 
 99. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 43, at 38–39. No oversight is typically imposed as long 
as the procedure is solely to benefit the patient. If the procedure is being performed to benefit 
another person—for example, removing a kidney for transplant into the patient’s sibling—court 
approval is necessary. See Rosato, supra note 86, at 57. 
 100. CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 18–19. 
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[State v. Koome, 530 P.2d 260, 265–66 (Wash. 1975);] 
sterilization, [In re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980); In re 
K.M., 816 P.2d 71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); In re Mary Moe, 
432 N.E.2d 712, 716–717 (Mass. 1982); In re Rebecca D. 
Nilsson, 471 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983);] and other 
similar invasive medical treatments, [State v. Baxter, 141 
P.3d 92 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (denying a father the right to 
circumcise his eight year old son with a hunting knife),] 
particularly where the interest of the parent may not be the 
same as those of the child [In re Hayes, 608 P.2d at 640; see 
also Koome, 530 P.2d at 263].
101
 
Many procedures performed on infants with a DSD have the 
potential to make orgasm difficult or impossible and may cause 
serious long-term medical complications.
102
 These invasive and 
potentially irreversible surgeries can permanently and dramatically 
infringe on the rights of people with an intersex condition to bodily 
integrity and sexual self-determination.
103
 In addition, safeguards are 
needed because parents may be making decisions at a time when 
they are suffering distress about giving birth to and raising an 
“abnormal” child. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for 
parents to determine objectively the treatment that would be in their 
child’s long-term interests, especially because the issue may affect 
sexuality when the child becomes an adult. Thus, these procedures 
should only be allowed under conditions that ensure that the child’s 
rights are protected.
104
 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Lee et al., supra note 13, at e491. 
 103. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (recognizing that a liberty interest extends 
beyond reproductive rights). In Lawrence, the Court held that a statute that criminalized same-sex 
sodomy was unconstitutional. The Court indicated that its holding would apply to situations 
beyond the criminalization of same-sex sexual acts. Id. at 574 (“[T]hese matters, involving the 
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life.” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 851 (1992))). A court could accordingly find that children with a DSD should have the 
power to determine for themselves whether they want to undergo medical procedures that could 
have a profound effect on their sexual relationships and their sense of self. 
 104. Alicia Ouellette has argued that parental decisions authorizing medical and surgical 
interventions to sculpt children’s bodies should be analyzed under a trust-based construct that 
would require neutral third-party approval, rather than giving complete deference to the parents’ 
decisions. See Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority over Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 
955 (2010). 
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Only one high court, the Constitutional Court of Colombia, has 
considered whether parents can consent to cosmetic genital surgery 
being performed on their children with a DSD.
105
 Because of a court 
decision in 1995, doctors in Colombia were concerned about 
potential liability for performing genital surgery on infants with an 
intersex condition. In two cases, doctors recommended that the 
children they were treating undergo cosmetic genital surgery, but the 
doctors who made the recommendation refused to proceed without a 
court order. The parents of the two children sought court authority 
for the procedures to occur.
106
 
The Constitutional Court of Colombia considered evidence that 
supported the traditional model as well as evidence that criticized 
this model and supported a moratorium on cosmetic genital surgeries 
on infants with an intersex condition. The court concluded that the 
uncertain and conflicting evidence put the law at an impasse. The 
court reasoned that prohibiting surgery until the children reach the 
age of consent would be engaging in social experimentation, but 
allowing the surgery to continue under the standard protocol would 
not ensure that the best interests of the children were protected.
107
 
The Colombian court decided that surgical modification of an 
infant with an intersex condition must be treated differently from 
other types of parental consent cases. The court decided that the 
traditional informed consent rules do not guarantee that parents are in 
the best position to make a decision on behalf of their child.
108
 The 
court was concerned because (1) parents typically lack information 
about intersexuality; (2) intersexuality is viewed as a disease that 
must be cured; and (3) treating physicians frequently convey a false 
sense of urgency to provide a quick cure.
109
 The Colombian court 
recognized that, under these circumstances, parents cannot easily 
distinguish their own fears and concerns from considerations of the 
 
 105. See Case 2 (Sentencia T-551/99), INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM. (Aug. 2, 1999), 
http://www.isna.org/node/126; Sentencia SU-337/99, Pt. I, supra note 98. These decisions are 
reported in Spanish and can be found at Texts of Colombia Decisions, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. 
AM., http://www.isna.org/node/516 (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). For a translation of a portion of 
decision SU-337/99 into English, see Nohemy Solórzano-Thompson, The Rights of Intersexed 
Infants and Children: Decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court, Bogotá, Colombia, 12 
May 1999 (SU-337/99), in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 122 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006). 
 106. Solórzano-Thompson, supra note 105, at 122. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 129–30. 
 109. See id. at 130, 132. 
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“best interests” of their child.
110
 The court concluded that parents 
may approve these surgeries to “normalize” their children, whom 
they view as “strange beings.”
111
 
The Colombian court decided to follow a middle path to protect 
the human rights of infants. It struck a balance between allowing 
parents full autonomy to consent to surgical alteration on behalf of 
their infant and barring all such surgeries.
112
 The court called on 
legal and medical institutions to establish “qualified and persistent” 
informed consent procedures to protect the rights of children with an 
intersex condition until comprehensive studies clearly establish the 
course of treatment that is in these children’s best interests.
113
 
The court held that “qualified and consistent informed consent” 
requires that the following conditions be met. 
1. The consent must be in writing. 
2. The information provided must be complete. The parents 
must be informed about the dangers of current 
treatments, the existence of other paradigms, and the 
possibility of delaying surgeries and giving adequate 
psychological support to the children. 
3. The authorization must be given on several occasions 
over a reasonable time period to ensure the parents have 
enough time to truly understand the situation.
114
 
Advocates seeking to limit the number of infant cosmetic genital 
surgeries could adopt a number of approaches. They could call for a 
complete moratorium on all such surgeries performed without the 
informed consent of the person undergoing the treatment. 
Alternatively, they could advocate in favor of an enhanced informed 
consent standard similar to the procedures adopted in Colombia. 
Finally, they could seek regulations that would require supervision or 
approval of these procedures by an independent entity, such as a 
court or a hospital ethics committee. 
Convincing courts or legislatures to mandate any of these 
approaches will require that intersex advocates develop persuasive 
legal arguments supporting their assertion that cosmetic genital 
 
 110. Id. at 124. 
 111. Id. at 130. 
 112. Id. at 130–31. 
 113. Id. at 131. 
 114. Id. 
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surgeries should be subjected to enhanced scrutiny.
115
 Two legal 
frameworks that could support their arguments, sex discrimination 
and disability discrimination, are discussed in the next section. 
IV.  INFANT COSMETIC GENITAL SURGERIES: 
 SEX OR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION? 
Most states have adopted legislation prohibiting discrimination 
in the provision of health care.
116
 In addition, the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which was signed into law in 
2010, mandates that health care be provided on a nondiscriminatory 
basis.
117
 The PPACA does not specifically address the medical 
treatment of people with an intersex condition, but it does prohibit 
both sex and disability discrimination. 
The PPACA provides: 
[A]n individual shall not, on the ground prohibited 
under . . . title IX of the Education Amendment Act of 1972 
(20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) [prohibiting sex discrimination] . . . 
or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 
794) [prohibiting disability discrimination], be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under, any health program or 
activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial 
assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of 
insurance, or under any program or activity that is 
 
 115. If the surgery results in sterilization, heightened scrutiny should be required and doctors 
should not be able to proceed without court review. The remainder of this Article focuses on 
surgeries not resulting in sterilization and explains why these surgeries should also be subjected 
to regulation and oversight. 
 116. States typically prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex and disability in the provision 
of health care under their public accommodations statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 
2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (2011); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4501–4504 (2009); D.C. CODE §§ 2-1401.02(24), -1402.31 (2010); HAW. REV. 
STAT. §§ 489-2 to -3 (2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 to -103 (2011); IOWA CODE 
§§ 216.2(13), .7 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4553(8), 4592 (2010); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 272, §§ 98, 92A (2009); MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.11, .03 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 233.010 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:2, -A:17 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4 
to -5 (2010); N.M. STAT. §§ 28-1-7, -2 (2011); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292(9), 296(2)(a) (2011); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-24-2 to -2.1 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (2011); WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 49.60.215, .040 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 106.52 (2012). 
 117. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1557, 124 Stat. 
119, 260 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18116(a) (2010)). 
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administered by an Executive Agency or any entity 
established under this title (or amendments).
118
 
Therefore, to the extent that hospitals or physicians are subject 
to the PPACA or state laws prohibiting discrimination in the 
provision of health care, they would be violating the law if their 
medical treatment of infants born with an intersex condition is 
considered sex or disability discrimination. 
A.  Sex Discrimination 
The PPACA and state laws prohibiting sex discrimination in the 
provision of health care are similar to other statues that prohibit 
discrimination because of “sex” in that they do not delineate acts that 
constitute impermissible sex discrimination. Although hundreds of 
federal, state, and local laws and regulations prohibit sex 
discrimination in a number of settings,
119
 the meaning of the term 
“sex” in these legislative acts is far from clear. Therefore, during the 
last forty years, courts have been asked to determine exactly what 
types of acts violate statutory prohibitions against sex discrimination. 
When laws prohibiting sex discrimination were first adopted, 
courts tended to rule that the purpose of the legislation was to 
provide equal opportunities for women and men. The typical early 
successful sex discrimination cases involved men or women who 
were treated differently because of their biological sex. For example, 
early decisions invalidated employer rules that provided only men 
could be airline pilots and only women could be flight attendants.
120
 
During the first three decades after sex discrimination 
prohibitions were enacted in 1964, courts generally refused to 
expand the meaning of the term “sex” beyond this simple approach. 
Typically, the statutory ban against sex discrimination did not protect 
people from discriminatory treatment based on their status as a man 
or woman who failed to conform to gender role stereotypes,
121
 a 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. See, e.g., Education Amendment Act of 1972 tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006) 
(prohibiting sex discrimination in education); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to e-17 (2006) (forbidding sex discrimination in employment). 
 120. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding 
that Pan Am’s policy of hiring only females for flight attendant positions violated Title VII). 
 121. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family 
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 103 (2003) 
(citing Chi v. Age Grp., Ltd., No. 94 CIV 5253 (AGS), 1996 WL 627580, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
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pregnant woman,
122
 a gay or lesbian person,
123
 or a transgender 
person.
124
 
Whether these statutes would prohibit discrimination against a 
person with an intersex condition is also questionable. Wood v. C.G. 
Studios, Inc.
125
 is the only reported case that has addressed 
discrimination directed against a person based on her intersex 
condition. In Wood, an employer terminated one of its employees 
after learning that the employee “had undergone surgery to correct 
her hermaphroditic condition.”
126
 The federal district court refused to 
treat the employer’s actions as unlawful sex discrimination. The 
court analyzed the history of the act and found that the purpose of the 
legislation was to provide equal employment opportunities to 
women. Consequently, the court determined that the statute was not 
intended to remedy discrimination against individuals because they 
had undergone gender-corrective surgery.
127
 The court limited the 
meaning of the word “sex” in the statute to what it considered to be 
the word’s “plain meaning,” and held that sex discrimination 
prohibitions do not encompass discrimination against 
“hermaphrodites” because of their intersex status.
128
 
These limited visions of the scope of sex discrimination 
prohibitions began to dissolve in large part due to the feminist and 
 
Oct. 29, 1996); Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 1997); Martinez v. N.B.C. 
Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833 
(SHS), 1996 WL 374151, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996); Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, 
Inc., 926 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Tenn. 1996)). 
 122. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 123. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); 
DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330–31 (9th Cir. 1979). A number of later cases 
have followed this approach, including Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36–37 (2d Cir. 2000), 
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085–86 (7th Cir. 2000), and Higgins v. New 
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 124. See, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway 
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663–64 (9th Cir. 1977); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 285–86 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., Civ. A. No. 84-3296, 
1985 WL 9446, at *1–2 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985); Terry v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 
Civ. A. No. 80-C-408, 1980 WL 334, at *1–3 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 1980); Powell v. Read’s, Inc., 
436 F. Supp. 369, 370–71 (D. Md. 1977); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 
456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff’d mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978); Grossman v. Bernards Twp. 
Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975), aff’d mem., 538 F.2d 319 
(3d Cir. 1976). 
 125. 660 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 176–78. 
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LGBT movements and feminist and queer theorists, who helped to 
educate society and the judiciary about the complex nature of sex 
discrimination. These scholars and activists helped courts develop a 
more nuanced understanding of the meaning and harm of sex 
discrimination. 
The major expansion of the meaning of the word “sex” and the 
acts that encompass sex discrimination came from the Supreme 
Court’s 1989 ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
129
 In Price 
Waterhouse, an accounting firm denied a partnership to 
Ms. Hopkins, not because she was biologically a woman but because 
she failed to meet the partners’ stereotyped expectations of how a 
woman should behave. The partners implied that her failure to 
conform to stereotypes of femininity blocked her path to partnership. 
Specifically, Hopkins was told that she overcompensated for being a 
woman and was too “macho.”
130
 She was advised to stop using 
profanity, to take a class at charm school, and to “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear 
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”
131
 The Supreme 
Court ruled that discrimination against a woman because she failed 
to conform to societal stereotypes of femininity constituted 
discrimination based on “sex.”
132
 
The Court’s acceptance of sex stereotyping as a form of 
impermissible sex discrimination reflects a more sophisticated 
understanding of the harms of sex-based discriminatory conduct. 
Based on the Price Waterhouse decision, individuals who are treated 
differently because they fail to conform to sex-related stereotypes 
have been able to prove that they were subjected to impermissible 
sex discrimination if they appropriately frame their claims as gender 
nonconformity or sex stereotyping discrimination. 
A number of courts have embraced the concept that gender role 
performance, sexual orientation, and gender identity are part of a 
person’s “sex.” These courts have prohibited discrimination against 
people whose gender roles, gender behaviors, and gender identities 
fail to conform to societal norms. This more nuanced understanding 
of sex discrimination could form the basis for a claim that cosmetic 
 
 129. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 130. Id. at 235. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 258. 
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genital surgery performed on an infant with an intersex condition 
constitutes discrimination because of “sex.” 
1.  Gender Role Performance 
Many men and women suffer from discrimination when they opt 
to fulfill roles that do not comport with societal stereotypes about 
appropriate functions for males and females. Courts originally ruled 
that sex discrimination statutes did not encompass discrimination 
based on gender role stereotyping.
133
 Recently, however, some courts 
have allowed recovery based on this theory. 
For example, new mothers have recovered when they sued for 
discrimination based on gender role performance stereotyping.
134
 In 
these cases, employers discriminated against new mothers because 
the employers believed that the new mothers would fail to conform 
to the norm of the ideal worker. For example, in Back v. Hastings on 
Hudson Union Free School District,
135
 a school psychologist, Elena 
Back, filed a sex stereotyping claim when she was denied tenure. Ms. 
Back took a maternity leave after she gave birth. She returned to 
work and was subsequently denied tenure. During the review 
process, her supervisors made comments questioning her ability as a 
new mother to devote herself to her job. The court held that these 
statements were evidence of impermissible sex stereotyping 
discrimination because they indicated a presumption that being a 
mother is incompatible with being an effective worker.
136
 
Similarly, some courts have granted recovery to men who 
suffered discrimination because they failed to conform to the norm of 
a male breadwinner when they sought time off for family care 
responsibilities.
137
 For example, in Knussman v. Maryland,
138
 
Maryland State Trooper Howard Kevin Knussman alleged that he 
suffered sex discrimination when his employer refused to grant him 
paid leave to care for his wife and newborn child. His wife suffered 
 
 133. See Williams & Segal, supra note 121, at 123–30. 
 134. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 
2004); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044–45 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that discrimination 
against new mothers based on assumptions about the employees’ ability to be both mothers and 
good workers constitutes impermissible sex stereotyping). 
 135. 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 136. Id. at 120. 
 137. E.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 138. Id. 
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from medical problems during the pregnancy and after the birth. 
Knussman sought paid leave under a gender-neutral statute granting 
“nurturing leave” for the care of a newborn. The court ruled that the 
employer engaged in unlawful sex discrimination when it denied 
paid leave to Mr. Knussman. The court ruled that the employer’s 
decision was based on stereotypes about the proper roles for men and 
women.
139
 
2.  Gender Behavior 
Gays and lesbians, who before Price Waterhouse consistently 
lost their sex discrimination claims, are now sometimes successful in 
convincing courts that they were victims of sex discrimination when 
they were harassed or otherwise discriminated against because they 
failed to conform to sex and gender norms.
140
 
For example, in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.,
141
 Medina 
Rene, an openly gay male butler at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las 
Vegas, was able to prove that other butlers had engaged in 
impermissible sex discrimination. All the other butlers, including 
Rene’s supervisor, were male. Rene testified that during a two-year 
period at the MGM Grand, he had been continuously subjected to 
harassment by his supervisor and fellow butlers. The harassers 
whistled and blew kisses at Rene; they called him “sweetheart” and 
“muñeca” (Spanish for “doll”); they gave him sexually oriented 
“joke” gifts; and they forced him to look at pictures of naked men 
having sex. He was also subjected to physical harassment of a sexual 
nature. Rene stated that the other employees would treat him as they 
would treat a woman because they knew he was gay. The court held 
that the fact that he was treated “like a woman” constitutes ample 
evidence of impermissible gender stereotyping.
142
 
 
 139. Id. at 636. 
 140. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 538 U.S. 922 (2003); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F. 3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Schmedding v. Tnemec Co. Inc., 187 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999). A number of courts continue to 
deny recovery to gays and lesbians if the employees allege they were harassed because of their 
sexual orientation. See, e.g., Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 
704 (7th Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 
1999); Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, No. 97 C 8342, 2000 WL 336528 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Mims 
v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706, 714 (E.D. Tex. 2000). 
 141. 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 142. Id. at 1069. 
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Similarly, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,
143
 
Antonio Sanchez, a male waiter, alleged that he had been subjected 
to an unrelenting barrage of verbal abuse because he was perceived 
as being insufficiently masculine. He was called sexually derogatory 
names, referred to in the female gender, and taunted for behaving 
like a woman. The court applied the Price Waterhouse gender 
stereotyping theory and concluded that harassment generated by a 
person’s failure to conform to male stereotypical behavior constitutes 
impermissible sex discrimination.
144
 
3.  Gender Identity 
Before the decision in Price Waterhouse, transgender plaintiffs 
consistently lost their cases when they tried to state a claim for sex 
discrimination. Early courts ruled that discrimination against people 
whose gender identity did not conform to the sex assigned to them at 
birth was not prohibited under sex discrimination statutes.
145
 Since 
Price Waterhouse, however, a number of courts have held that 
discrimination against transgender people because their gender 
identity fails to conform to their natal sex constitutes impermissible 
sex discrimination.
146
 
In Smith v. City of Salem,
147
 firefighting lieutenant, Jimmie 
Smith, had worked for seven years in the Salem Fire Department 
without any negative incidents. After Lieutenant Smith began his 
transition to becoming a woman, his coworkers began questioning 
him about his appearance and commenting that his looks and 
mannerisms were not “masculine enough.”
148
 Smith decided to 
notify his supervisor that he was in the process of transitioning and 
 
 143. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 144. Id. at 874–75. 
 145. See supra note 124. 
 146. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Barnes v. City of 
Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 
2004); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). The 
EEOC also adopted this approach in Macy. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Decision No. 0120120821 
(2012), http://transgenderlawcenter.org/cms/blogs/552-24#ruling. The EEOC concluded that 
“discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by 
definition, discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’ and such discrimination therefore violates Title VII.” 
Id. at 14. The sex stereotyping theory has not been universally accepted in all cases involving 
transgender plaintiffs. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 147. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 148. Id. at 568. 
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he would eventually undergo a complete physical transformation and 
become a woman. After he disclosed his transgender status, his 
employer instituted a plan to fire him.
149
 The court held that the fire 
department discriminated against Smith based on the Price 
Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory because the treatment was based 
on Smith’s failure to conform to gender norms of how men should 
look and behave. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the earlier cases that 
had denied the ability of transgender people to recover for sex 
discrimination were “eviscerated” by the 1989 holding in Price 
Waterhouse.
150
 The Sixth Circuit reinforced this approach one year 
later in Barnes v. Cincinnati.
151
 
In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s 
approach. In Glenn v. Brumby,
152
 the appellate court affirmed the 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a transgender 
plaintiff who brought an equal protection sex discrimination claim. 
Vandiver Glenn sued for sex discrimination when the Georgia 
General Assembly’s Office of Legislative Counsel fired her from her 
editorial position after she notified her supervisor that she identified 
as a woman and was beginning her transition to living and presenting 
as a female. Her employer, Sewell Brumby, stated that her 
appearance was inappropriate, and he found it “unsettling to think of 
someone dressed in women’s clothing with male sexual organs 
inside that clothing,” and “that a male in women’s clothing is 
‘unnatural.’”
153
 When he fired her, he stated that her “intended 
gender transition was inappropriate, that it would be disruptive, that 
some people would view it as a moral issue, and that it would make 
Glenn’s coworkers uncomfortable.”
154
 The Eleventh Circuit ruled 
that discrimination against people because of their transgender status 
constitutes impermissible sex discrimination because the 
discrimination is based on their failure to conform to gender 
stereotypes.
155
 
A number of other circuit courts have reached similar 
conclusions under other statutes prohibiting sex discrimination. For 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 573. 
 151. 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 152. 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 153. Id. at 1314. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1320. 
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example, in Schwenk v. Hartford,
156
 the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
discrimination against a transgender plaintiff because she failed to 
act like a man constituted impermissible sex discrimination under the 
Gender Motivated Violence Act. The First Circuit adopted a similar 
approach when it determined that refusing a loan to a transgender 
plaintiff because she failed to dress in accordance with prescribed 
gender roles violated the prohibition against sex discrimination in the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
157
 A number of district courts have 
also ruled that transgender plaintiffs who suffer differential treatment 
because of their failure to comply with stereotypical gender norms 
have been subjected to impermissible sex discrimination.
158
 
The ability of transgender people to recover under a sex 
discrimination theory expanded dramatically after the 2008 federal 
district court ruling in Schroer v. Billington.
159
 Diane Schroer, a 
male-to-female transsexual, applied for a position with the research 
division of the Library of Congress as a terrorism specialist 
providing expert policy analysis to Congress. When she applied for 
the job, she had not yet transitioned so she used her legal male name, 
David, on the application and she attended the interview in male 
clothing. She received the highest score of the eighteen candidates 
and she was offered the job. Diane accepted the position, but before 
she began work, she notified the person in charge of hiring that she 
would begin work as a female. The job offer was revoked and Diane 
sued. 
The court found that the Library of Congress had engaged in 
unlawful sex discrimination for two reasons. First, the court found 
that Diane was denied the job based on the sex stereotyping theory 
developed in Price Waterhouse. The court concluded that different 
comments by the employer indicated that Diane was viewed as “an 
insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or 
an inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual.”
160
 The court 
 
 156. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 157. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 158. See, e.g., Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 
659–61 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, No. 05-243, 2006 WL 986971 (W.D. 
Pa. Feb. 21, 2006); Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 
2008954 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004), aff’d, 325 F. App’x. 492 (9th Cir. 2009); Tronetti v. TLC 
Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03–CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 22757935 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 
2003). 
 159. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 160. Id. at 305. 
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stated: “[T]he Library was enthusiastic about hiring David Schroer—
until she disclosed her transsexuality. The Library revoked the offer 
when it learned that a man named David intended to become, legally, 
culturally, and physically, a woman named Diane. This was 
discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”
161
 
More important, the court found that, in addition to stating a sex 
stereotyping discrimination claim, Schroer could recover under a 
straightforward sex discrimination theory and did not need to rely on 
the stereotyping approach. The court ruled that people who “change” 
their sex and suffer discrimination because of the transition have 
suffered sex discrimination. The court continued: 
Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts 
from Christianity to Judaism. Imagine too that her employer 
testifies that he harbors no bias toward either Christians or 
Jews but only “converts.” That would be a clear case of 
discrimination “because of religion.” No court would take 
seriously the notion that “converts” are not covered by the 
statute. Discrimination “because of religion” easily 
encompasses discrimination because of a change of 
religion. But in cases where the plaintiff has changed her 
sex, and faces discrimination because of the decision to stop 
presenting as a man and to start appearing as a woman, 
courts have traditionally carved such persons out of the 
statute by concluding that “transsexuality” is unprotected by 
Title VII. In other words, courts have allowed their focus on 
the label “transsexual” to blind them to the statutory 
language itself.
162
 
The holding of the Schroer court calls into serious question the 
continuing validity of the single employment discrimination case 
involving an employee with an intersex condition.
163
 In 1987, a 
district court held that Wilma Wood had not been subjected to sex 
discrimination when her employer fired her after learning about her 
intersex condition.
164
 The court reasoned that sex discrimination 
prohibitions were designed to provide equal employment 
opportunities to women and were not meant to protect women who 
 
 161. Id. at 306. 
 162. Id. at 306–07. 
 163. Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 164. Id. at 177–78. 
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had undergone gender corrective surgery. The holding in Wood is 
consistent with the understanding of the scope of sex discrimination 
prohibitions during the 1980s. All the cases at that time narrowly 
construed the reach of statutes prohibiting sex discrimination. Just as 
Price Waterhouse eviscerated the holdings in earlier sex 
discrimination cases brought by gay, lesbian, transgender, and other 
gender nonconforming people, it should be interpreted to eviscerate 
the holding in Wood. Discrimination against people with an intersex 
condition should be treated similarly to the treatment of transgender 
people in the Schroer decision. If discrimination against transgender 
people who have transitioned from one sex to the other constitutes 
impermissible sex discrimination, people who have been 
discriminated against based on their DSD status also have been 
subjected to unlawful sex discrimination. 
4.  Applying Sex Discrimination Principles  
to the Medical Treatment of Infants with a DSD 
Now that courts recognize that statutory prohibitions against sex 
discrimination protect people from discrimination based on sex and 
gender stereotypes, a sex discrimination framework could be an 
effective tool for challenging cosmetic genital surgeries and other 
medical protocols performed on infants with an intersex condition. If 
infants with a DSD are subjected to differential treatment because 
they fail to conform to stereotypical sex norms, the differential 
treatment could be considered impermissible sex discrimination. 
Therefore, the question that must be asked is why are children 
with a DSD being subjected to these procedures? Four current 
treatment protocols are based at least in part on sex and/or gender 
stereotypes: 
a. Surgeries to reduce the size of a girl’s clitoris; 
b. Dexamethasone administration to pregnant women 
carrying children who are at risk of having congenital 
adrenal hyperplasia; 
c. Surgeries to create a vagina in girls who are born with no 
vagina or a shortened vaginal canal; and 
d. Surgeries to move the urethral opening to the tip of a 
boy’s penis. 
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a.  Surgeries to reduce the size of the clitoris 
Many physicians treating infants with an intersex condition 
believe that children who will be raised as girls should not have a 
larger-than-average clitoris. If doctors believe a girl’s clitoris is too 
large, they will recommend that the infant undergo clitoral reduction 
surgery. The basis for this recommendation is the unproven 
assumption that clitoral reduction surgery will enhance the girl’s 
psychological well-being. Although no studies have proven the 
benefit of these procedures, these surgeries often lead to a number of 
serious problems. They may make it difficult or impossible for a 
woman to experience an orgasm. They may also cause infection, 
scarring, incontinence, and other severe physical complications. 
Many medical experts, scholars, and people who have been subjected 
to these surgeries assert that these medical procedures often cause 
stigma, psychological trauma, and lifelong physical complications, 
without proof of any benefit to the child.
165
 
Why would parents consent to surgeries with these risks? One 
study indicates that parents prioritize genital appearance over  erotic 
responsiveness. A study asked parents of children born with an 
intersex condition to rank the importance of sexual responsiveness 
and genital appearance. Ninety-five percent of the parents indicated 
that they would have authorized genital surgery, even if a reduction 
in sexual responsiveness was certain.
166
 In other words, doctors 
recommend and parents consent to these surgeries based on the 
gender stereotype that females care more about their genital 
appearance than they do about their ability to engage in satisfactory 
sex.
167
 
This assumption is not only a gender stereotype; based on a 
study of female college students, it also appears to be a false gender 
stereotype. A group of female college students was asked to imagine 
 
 165. See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 42; see supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 166. Jennifer E. Dayner et al., Medical Treatment of Intersex: Parental Perspectives, 172 J. 
UROLOGY 1762, 1764–65 (2004). 
 167. Prioritizing conformity to cultural norms should not be used to justify a surgery that is 
not desired by the person undergoing the treatment. For an excellent comparison of the 
similarities between the cultural norms underlying female genital cutting as it is practiced in non-
western societies and genital cutting of infants with an intersex condition that is performed in 
western nations, see Nancy Ehrenreich with Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital 
Cutting, and the Selective Condemnation of “Cultural Practices,” 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
71 (2005). 
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that they had been born with a clitoris larger than one centimeter at 
birth.
168
 An overwhelming 93 percent of the students reported that 
they would not have wanted their parents to agree to surgery to alter 
the appearance of their genitalia if it resulted in the loss of orgasm or 
pleasurable sensitivity. More than 50 percent of the women would 
not have wanted surgery even if the condition was unattractive and 
made them feel uncomfortable. The students were more likely to 
want surgery to reduce a large nose, ears, or breasts than surgery to 
reduce an enlarged clitoris. This result is consistent with the 
women’s ratings of the importance of genital sensation and capacity 
to orgasm, which they ranked as very important as compared to the 
size of the clitoris, which was ranked as only somewhat important.
169
 
Therefore, surgeries being performed based on the false gender 
stereotype that women emphasize genital appearance over erotic 
response could be viewed as a form of impermissible sex 
stereotyping discrimination. 
b.  Dexamethasone administration to pregnant women carrying 
children who are at risk of having congenital adrenal hyperplasia 
Surgical interventions are not the only technique doctors have 
relied on to produce “acceptable” female genitalia. Some doctors 
have also experimented with other methods to alter the genitalia of 
infants with an intersex condition. For example, instead of 
performing surgery after the child is born, some doctors administer 
drugs to pregnant mothers who may be carrying a child with one type 
of DSD, 21-hydroxylase deficiency CAH, which is an adrenal 
disorder that can lead to the formation of atypical genitalia.
170
 
An XX fetus with CAH has adrenal glands that produce high 
levels of androgens, which are masculinizing hormones. Depending 
on the level of exposure, these children may be born with genitalia 
that have been partially masculinized. Some doctors are 
administering dexamethasone to pregnant women who are at risk of 
carrying an XX child with CAH because this drug may be effective 
in stopping the masculinization of the genitalia.
171
 
 
 168. KESSLER, supra note 26, at 101. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., Nimkarn & New, supra note 54, at 53. 
 171. Id. at 53, 56; Catherine Elton, A Prenatal Treatment Raises Questions of Medical Ethics, 
TIME, (June 18, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1996453,00.html. 
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This practice is problematic because it can cause significant 
harm to the fetus. Prenatal exposure to dexamethasone has been 
shown to cause brain changes.
172
 Children who have been exposed 
have displayed problems with working memory, verbal processing, 
and anxiety.
173
 
Administering this drug is also problematic because it exposes 
fetuses that will not be negatively affected by CAH to these dangers. 
To prevent masculinization of the genitalia, dexamethasone must be 
administered early in the pregnancy at approximately the sixth or 
seventh week of gestation.
174
 At this point in the pregnancy, doctors 
are not able to determine whether the fetus is XX or XY or whether 
the fetus has CAH.
175
 XY infants, with or without CAH, and XX 
infants who do not have CAH need not be exposed to this drug. The 
only purpose for administering the drug is to prevent virilization in 
XX infants who also have CAH.
176
 A mother who has given birth to 
a child with CAH has a one-in-eight chance of carrying an XX fetus 
with CAH.
177
 Therefore, the vast majority of fetuses exposed to 
dexamethasone have no reason to be exposed to the drug because it 
will provide absolutely no benefit. Dexamethasone could potentially 
provide a benefit to approximately 10 percent of the fetuses being 
exposed to it by preventing the development of masculinized 
genitalia in an XX fetus, but the goal of producing cosmetically 
acceptable genitalia is being sought at the expense of creating a 
significant risk of harm to the 90 percent of the fetuses that will 
receive absolutely no benefit. 
 
 172. Noel P. French et al., Repeated Antenatal Corticosteroids: Effects on Cerebral Palsy and 
Childhood Behavior, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 588, 591–92 (2004). 
 173. See, e.g., Tatja Hirvikoski et al., Cognitive Functions in Children at Risk for Congenital 
Adrenal Hyperplasia Treated Prenatally with Dexamethasone, 92 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY 
& METABOLISM 542, 544–47 (2007). 
 174. Svetlana Lajic et al., Prenatal Treatment of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, 151 EUR. 
J. ENDOCRINOLOGY U63, U64 (2004). 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. If a woman has given birth to a CAH child and she conceives another child with the 
same father, only one in eight pregnancies will be a female fetus with CAH who might be helped 
by the treatment. Four of the eight fetuses will be male and three of the eight fetuses will be 
unaffected females. 
  
892 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:849 
In 2010, a group of experts convened to review clinical practice 
guidelines for the treatment of CAH.
178
 They decided that the 
administration of dexamethasone to pregnant women should be 
considered experimental.
179
 They recommended that this treatment 
should be pursued only through “protocols approved by Institutional 
Review Boards at centers capable of collecting outcomes data on a 
sufficiently large number of patients so that risks and benefits of this 
treatment can be defined more precisely.”
180
 
Diminishing the size of the clitoris is not the only benefit that 
physicians claim this drug could accomplish. Researchers have also 
noted that this drug may enhance feminine thinking and behavior in 
an XX fetus with CAH.
181
 Women with CAH have a higher 
likelihood of being bisexual or lesbian, and often display behavior 
that is considered “tomboyish.”
182
 Some researchers have implied 
that administration of dexamethasone to pregnant women may solve 
this “problem.” One study reported: 
CAH women as a group have a lower interest than controls 
in getting married and performing the traditional child-
care/housewife role. As children, they show an unusually 
low interest in engaging in maternal play with baby dolls, 
and their interest in caring for infants, the frequency of 
daydreams or fantasies of pregnancy and motherhood, or 
the expressed wish of experiencing pregnancy and having 
children of their own appear to be relatively low in all age 
groups. 
. . . . 
. . . Long term follow-up studies of the behavioral outcome 
will show whether dexamethasone treatment also prevents 
the effects of prenatal androgens on brain and 
behavior. . . .
183
 
 
 178. Phyllis W. Speiser et al., Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia Due to Steroid 21-
Hydroxylase Deficiency: An Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline, 95 J. CLINICAL 
ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 4133, 4137 (2010). 
 179. Id. 
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 181. See Heino Meyer-Bahlburg, What Causes Low Rates of Childbearing in Congenital 
Adrenal Hyperplasia?, 84 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 1844, 1845–46 (1999). 
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 183. Id. (citations omitted). For a thorough critique of the use of dexamethasone, see Alice 
Dreger et al., Preventing Homosexuality (and Uppity Women) in the Womb?, BIOETHICS FORUM 
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In other words, some doctors are suggesting that they could be 
improving girls’ lives by enhancing the likelihood that they will want 
to fulfill the traditional female roles of housewife and mother. A 
treatment that carries significant risk to unaffected fetuses, as well as 
an XX fetus carrying CAH, that is designed to feminize the genitalia 
and potentially turn “tomboyish” girls into females who fantasize 
about becoming wives and mothers supports the argument that this 
health care protocol is based on gender stereotypes. 
c.  Surgeries to create a vagina 
Some DSDs may result in a girl being born without a vagina or 
with a vaginal canal that is shortened.
184
 Doctors will perform 
surgeries on these girls to create a vagina or to expand the shortened 
vagina. Females require a vagina for menstrual flow, giving birth, 
and engaging in traditional heterosexual intercourse. Some women 
with an intersex condition do not menstruate and cannot bear 
children, so the only reason for them to have a vagina created is to 
allow them to engage in heterosexual intercourse.
185
 Although 
infants and young children do not have any use for a vagina, until 
recently, physicians typically performed these surgeries on infants 
based on the unsupported assumption that performing these surgeries 
while the child is too young to understand the significance is less 
psychologically traumatic.
186
 These surgeries often require parents to 
dilate the vagina to maintain its size.
187
 
The 2006 Consensus Statement recommends that these surgeries 
be postponed until adolescence.
188
 Some physicians, however, still 
recommend that the vaginoplasty be performed in some 
circumstances when the child is still an infant.
189
 
 
BLOG (June 29, 2010, 6:17 PM), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id= 
4754&blogid=140. 
 184. Sarah Creighton, Surgery for Intersex, 94 J. FOR ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 218, 219 (2001). 
For example, girls with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome or congenital adrenal 
hyperplasia may have a normal vagina, a shortened vagina, or no vagina. 
 185. Id. For example, girls with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome do not have a 
uterus and ovaries. Therefore, they do not menstruate and they cannot bear children. 
 186. KESSLER, supra note 26, at 49; Speiser, supra note 178, at 4143. 
 187. KESSLER, supra note 26, at 49. 
 188. Lee et al., supra note 13, at e492. 
 189. Speiser, supra note 178, at 4143 (acknowledging that systematic long-term evaluation of 
the benefits and risks of early as opposed to later surgery do not exist). 
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The need to create a vagina in a girl who will not menstruate or 
bear children is based on the assumption that all females will desire a 
vagina so that they will be able to engage in sexual intercourse with a 
man. When parents consent to these surgeries, they may not be 
making the decision that their children would want. The same survey 
that asked female students whether they would have wanted their 
parents to consent to clitoral reduction surgery questioned women 
about whether they would have wanted their parents to consent to 
vaginoplasty.
190
 Most of them would not have wanted vaginal 
surgery, even if the condition made them feel uncomfortable or 
limited their ability to engage in sexual intercourse.
191
 The women 
surveyed believed that the impact of not having a vagina during 
childhood would not have affected their self-esteem.
192
 
Therefore, creating a vagina in a female for the sole purpose of 
facilitating intercourse with a man is based on the false gender 
stereotype that all women will desire heterosexual intercourse. It also 
perpetuates the vision of women as passive recipients of men’s 
sexual desires.
193
 Not all women will want to engage in heterosexual 
intercourse, and those who have this desire can consent to the 
surgery when they decide to become sexually active. Creating a 
vagina in girls who will not menstruate or bear children and who 
may never desire a vagina for sexual intercourse with a man supports 
a finding that these medical procedures are based on gender 
stereotypes. 
d.  Surgeries to move the urethral opening 
 to the tip of a boy’s penis 
A common congenital condition, hypospadias, occurs in 
approximately 1 in 200–300 live births.
194
 In males with 
hypospadias, the urethral opening is located somewhere along the 
underside of the penis rather than at its tip. In the vast majority of 
cases, there is no medical reason to move the urethral opening. 
Typically, however, male infants are subjected to surgeries to move 
 
 190. KESSLER, supra note 26, at 102. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Ehrenreich, supra note 167, at 125. 
 194. Laurence S. Baskin & Michele B. Ebbers, Hypospadias: Anatomy, Etiology, and 
Technique, 41 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 463 (2006). 
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the urethral opening to the end of the penis. Doctors recommend that 
these surgeries be performed when the boys are six months old. 
Although these surgeries could be delayed until the males reach the 
age of consent and could decide for themselves whether to undergo 
this procedure, they are performed in infancy based on the unproven 
assumption that boys growing up with an atypical penis will suffer 
emotional trauma.
195
 
Although some boys require only one surgery, many males with 
hypospadias have been subjected to multiple invasive surgeries. 
These procedures have resulted in physical scarring, poor cosmetic 
results, and difficulty in urinating,
196
 without proof that they are 
beneficial. 
When males were surveyed about whether they would have 
wanted their parents to consent to surgery if their urethral opening 
was off center, one-third of the men reported that they would not 
have wanted their parents to consent even if it meant that they would 
not have been able to urinate in a standing position.
197
 Three-fourths 
of them would have rejected the surgery if it resulted in the loss of 
pleasurable sensitivity.
198
 
Just as young girls with atypical genitalia are subjected to 
invasive cosmetic genital surgeries to conform their bodies to a 
feminine norm, infant boys with hypospadias are subjected to 
surgeries that have no medical justification solely to bring their 
bodies into conformity with stereotypical notions of masculinity. As 
one commentator wrote, “[B]oys who cannot urinate in what is 
referred to as the ‘male’ manner are said not to be able to 
‘demonstrat[e] their prowess at urinating at certain distances in 
competition with other boys . . . which could lead to competence 
anxieties related to their penis.”
199
 
Intersex advocates believe that these four medical procedures 
should no longer be performed on infants with a DSD. No studies 
prove that they are clearly beneficial and evidence exists that they 
may lead to serious physical and psychological trauma. Current 
 
 195. Id. at 467. 
 196. Id. at 466. 
 197. KESSLER, supra note 26, at 102. 
 198. Id. 
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treatment protocols for infants with an intersex condition (1) 
prioritize cosmetic appearance over the ability to orgasm for women; 
(2) are assumed to be beneficial because they may enhance the 
likelihood of “feminine” desires in girls; (3) are based on the 
presumption that all women will want to engage in heterosexual 
intercourse; or (4) are performed on the assumption that boys who 
cannot urinate in a standing position are not sufficiently masculine. 
To the extent that these procedures are performed for these reasons, 
the treatment decisions are based on sex and gender stereotypes 
about manhood and womanhood. If physicians and hospitals 
recommend these procedures because they decide that a child is not 
sufficiently masculine or feminine, they are arguably engaging in a 
form of sex discrimination. 
B.  Disability Discrimination 
The current medical protocol for the treatment of infants with a 
DSD could also be considered a form of disability discrimination. 
Disability discrimination is prohibited under a number of federal and 
state laws. 
1.  The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
The ADA provides the primary avenue in the United States for 
pursuing a disability claim.
200
 This federal law prohibits 
discrimination against a person with a disability in a number of areas, 
including the provision of health services.
201
 
Thus far, no one with an intersex condition has brought a claim 
under the ADA or other disability statutes. These statutes may 
provide a means to limit surgical alterations of infants with an 
intersex condition and eliminate the stigma associated with such 
conditions. 
Section 12102(2) of the ADA provides the basic ADA rules. 
This section defines disability as: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
 
 200. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). 
 201. Id. §§ 12132, 12182. 
  
Spring 2012] HEALTH CARE ISSUES 897 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
202
 
Some intersex conditions create medical risks that qualify as an 
actual impairment under § 12102(2)(A). For example, people with an 
intersex condition that impairs the endocrine and bladder functions 
or results in infertility meet the definition of having a physical 
impairment under this section.
203
 Most people with an intersex 
condition, however, are not impaired. They are able to live full, 
productive lives without medical intervention. 
Although most people with a DSD are not actually impaired, 
they could still be covered under § 12102(2)(C) of the ADA if they 
are subjected to medical procedures because they are “regarded as 
having such an impairment.”
204
 Therefore, the reasons underlying the 
current medical protocol for infants with a DSD must be analyzed to 
determine whether they are based on the perception that people with 
a DSD are impaired. 
Doctors perform cosmetic genital surgery on infants with an 
intersex condition because they believe that people with a DSD will 
suffer psychological harm as children and as adults. They think that 
children who grow up with genitalia that look different from their 
peers’ genitalia will suffer emotional trauma. They also believe that 
adults with atypical genitalia will face obstacles in forming romantic 
relationships or engaging in reproductive or other sexual acts. These 
surgeries are not performed because adults with a DSD are actually 
impaired in their ability to form romantic and other relationships. 
Many adults with atypical genitalia who have not been subjected to 
surgical intervention were well-adjusted children and have formed 
meaningful long-term romantic and sexual relationships.
205
 
Therefore, these life-altering surgeries are performed because people 
with DSDs are perceived as being impaired. This differential 
treatment appears to meet the requirements of § 12102(2)(C). 
 
 202. Id. § 12102(2). 
 203. Id. § 12102(2)(A). This Article focuses on whether people with a DSD could state a 
disability claim based on the perception that they are disabled. For a more thorough analysis of 
whether specific DSDs could qualify as an actual impairment under § 12102(2)(A), see Yamuna 
Menon, The Intersex Community and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 43 CONN. L. REV. 
1221, 1238–40 (2011). 
 204. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). 
 205. See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 42, at 77. 
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The ADA also requires that the impairment or perceived 
impairment limit a major life activity.
206
 Under the ADA, major life 
activities include operations of major bodily functions, including but 
not limited to functions of the bladder, the endocrine system, and the 
reproductive system. Therefore, people with an intersex condition 
that affects these functions meet the requirement of a limitation of a 
major life activity. 
People with a DSD that does not affect these functions are 
unlikely to be limited from participating in any major life activities. 
Therefore, they would not meet the requirements of 
§ 12102(2)(A).
207
 They could still meet the ADA’s requirements 
under § 12102(3), which provides that for purposes of 
§ 12102(2)(C): 
An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as 
having such an impairment” if the individual establishes 
that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited 
under this chapter because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or not the 
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life 
activity.
208
 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has 
interpreted § 12102(3) to include individuals who are subjected to 
differential treatment because of the perceptions of others. The 
EEOC publication provides: 
(d) Persons Who Are Substantially Limited as a Result of 
Others’ Attitudes—This subpart covers individuals who 
have stigmatic conditions that constitute physical or mental 
impairments but that do not by themselves substantially 
limit a major life activity. The impairments become 
substantially limiting only because of the negative reactions 
of others toward the impairments. For example, a person 
who has experienced severe burns may have an impairment 
that is substantially limiting solely because of the attitudes 
of others. Similarly, a person who has a cosmetic 
disfigurement may be continuously refused employment 
 
 206. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 
 207. See id. 
 208. Id. § 12102(3). 
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because of employers’ fears about the negative reactions of 
co-workers or clients. These persons would be covered 
under the third part of the definition of the term 
“disability.”
209
 
Infants with an intersex condition frequently are subjected to 
medically unnecessary cosmetic surgeries that may impair their 
ability to engage in satisfactory sex, affect continence, render them 
infertile, and inflict severe psychological trauma. These surgeries, 
which have not been proven to be beneficial, are being performed on 
healthy children with an intersex condition even though procedures 
that pose the same risks would not be performed on children who do 
not have an intersex condition. Therefore, one could argue that 
subjecting these children to potentially disabling invasive surgeries 
because they are “perceived as being impaired” constitutes disability 
discrimination. 
2.  State Disability Laws 
In addition to federal disability laws, disability claims could also 
be based on violations of state laws. The recent report published by 
the WPAS involving the treatment of “Ashley X”
210
 provides a 
potential basis to bring a claim on behalf of children with an intersex 
condition.
211
 Ashley was born with profound developmental 
disabilities. Doctors predicted that her mental capacity would never 
develop beyond that of an infant. At the age of six, Ashley could not 
sit up, ambulate, or use speech. She was dependent on a gastronomy 
tube for her nutrition. Despite her disabilities, Ashley was an integral 
member of the family and her parents wanted to continue caring for 
her at home; they did not want her care to be put in the hands of 
strangers.
212
 
When Ashley began to display signs of early puberty, her 
parents became concerned that they would not be able to care for her 
 
 209. Section 902 Definition of the Term Disability, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N (Nov. 21, 2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html#902.8d (discussing 
§ 902.8(d)). 
 210. See CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 88. 
 211. Ashley X did not have an intersex condition; she was born with profound developmental 
disabilities. The reasoning that the WPAS applied to a child with developmental disabilities, 
however, could apply with equal force to a child born with an intersex condition. 
 212. Daniel F. Gunther & Douglas S. Diekema, Attenuating Growth in Children with 
Profound Developmental Disability: A New Approach to an Old Dilemma, 160 ARCHIVES 
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 1013 (2006). 
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as she continued to grow and mature. Ashley’s parents and doctors 
developed a plan to stunt Ashley’s growth and to repress her sexual 
development by having doctors perform a hysterectomy to prevent 
menstruation and a mastectomy to prevent development of breast 
tissue. They also planned to administer estrogen to prevent her from 
reaching her projected adult height and weight. The goals of these 
treatments were to allow Ashley’s parents to continue her home care 
and to avoid potential complications of early puberty.
213
 
Because of the extensive nature of the planned intervention, 
Ashley’s physicians sought guidance from the hospital ethics 
committee. The committee approved the proposed treatment and 
advised the parents to obtain legal advice regarding the procedures 
that would lead to sterility. The parents hired an attorney to advise 
them about whether they required a court order before they could 
initiate the procedures. Their attorney advised them that they did not 
need a court order, so they proceeded without one.
214
 
When news about Ashley’s treatment became public, disability 
rights groups protested.
215
 They argued that the motivation for the 
treatment may have been to benefit Ashley’s parents, rather than 
Ashley. They also argued that the treatment was dehumanizing.
216
 
Ashley’s treatment was subsequently investigated by the WPAS, 
the federally mandated protection and advocacy agency for the state 
of Washington. The WPAS has legal authority under federal law to 
investigate allegations of mistreatment of persons with a disability 
within the state of Washington. The WPAS determined that Ashley’s 
treatment violated her constitutional and common law rights and was 
a direct violation of Washington law. The agency ruled that parents 
and doctors cannot agree to sterilize children without a court order 
determining that the sterilization is in the child’s best interest.
217
 The 
court proceeding must be adversarial and the child’s interests must 
be zealously represented by a disinterested third party.
218
 
 
 213. See id. 
 214. CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 14. 
 215. See Dave Reynolds, Advocates Speak Out and Call For Investigations over “Ashley 
Treatment,” INCLUSION DAILY EXPRESS (Jan. 12, 2007), http://www.inclusiondaily.com/ 
archives/07/01/12/011207waashleyx.htm. 
 216. See id.; William Peace, The Ashley Treatment and the Making of a Pillow Angel: Protest 
from a Bad Cripple, COUNTERPUNCH (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.counterpunch.org/peace 
01182007.html. 
 217. CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 1. 
 218. Id. at 19. 
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The WPAS did not limit its holding to the procedures that 
resulted in sterilization. It also held that Ashley’s constitutional 
liberty and privacy rights were affected by any procedures that were 
invasive and irreversible.
219
 Therefore, the WPAS determined that 
the removal of Ashley’s breast buds and the administration of high 
doses of hormones also implicated her constitutional rights to liberty 
and privacy and should be subjected to court review.
220
 
Parental consent to cosmetic genital surgery performed on 
infants with a DSD involves issues similar to those that were raised 
in Ashley X’s case. Ashley’s parents and parents of children with a 
DSD who are faced with the difficult decision about whether to have 
their children undergo surgical alteration are clearly motivated by 
love and their desire to act in the best interests of their children. The 
procedures performed on Ashley X and infants with a DSD, 
however, are different from other life-altering decisions that parents 
make for their children. In cases involving profoundly disabled 
children and infants with a DSD, parents have limited information 
about the benefits and risks of the proposed procedures and may 
have difficulty separating their interests from their child’s best 
interest. In addition, some of these surgeries have the potential to 
infringe on constitutionally protected liberty and privacy rights. 
Therefore, before these procedures are performed, they should be 
subjected to additional review by a court and/or hospital ethics 
committee. Such a review can guarantee that all the relevant 
information is considered and that safeguards are followed to ensure 
that the best interests of the child undergoing the procedure are 
paramount.
221
 
Arguably, surgeries performed on infants with an intersex 
condition should be subjected to even greater scrutiny than are the 
treatments performed on children with developmental disabilities 
because eventually children with a DSD will mature and will be able 
to make these decisions for themselves. A person with 
developmental disabilities as severe as Ashley’s will never be able to 
 
 219. Id. at 22. 
 220. Id. at 24–25. 
 221. For an excellent discussion of the pros and cons of adopting various review approaches 
when the issue involves growth attenuation of profoundly disabled children, see Benjamin S. 
Wilfond et al., Navigating Growth Attenuation in Children with Profound Disabilities: Children’s 
Interests, Family Decision-Making, and Community Concerns, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–
Dec. 2010, at 27. 
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understand and consent to the treatment administered. She will 
always require her parents’ care and she will never be in a position to 
make these decisions for herself. In contrast, children with an 
intersex condition will eventually reach an age when they are able to 
provide their own informed consent. Therefore, performing highly 
invasive and potentially life-altering surgeries on infants with an 
intersex condition on the basis of parental consent alone is less 
justifiable. Given the fact that children with an intersex condition 
will eventually be able to make this decision on their own, a stronger 
argument exists for nonintervention during infancy. 
3.  Reaction of the Intersex Community 
 to Use of a Disability Framework 
Although disability discrimination statutes might prove to be a 
productive avenue for intersex advocates who want to limit or end 
infant cosmetic genital surgeries, many people with an intersex 
condition object to the use of a disability framework. A recent 
transition in the terminology used in this area illustrates this unease. 
Most physicians and some intersex activists have rejected the term 
“intersex” in favor of the term “Disorders of Sex Development.” 
222
 
Although DSD is becoming the norm in many medical publications, 
this change in terminology has not been met with universal support. 
Some activists reject the use of the term “disorder” because of 
the stigma that some in our society associate with people who are 
disabled or disordered.
223
 Some prefer that the “D” in DSD represent 
“difference” rather than “disorder,” while others have advocated for 
the use of VRD to represent “variations of reproductive 
development” because these terms avoid the stigmatization 
associated with the word “disorder.”
224
 
 
 222. Holmes, supra note 3, at 2–5. 
 223. Organisation Intersex International (OII) is critical of the term “DSD” because it 
increases medical pathologization and stigma associated with the term “disorder.” Curtis E. 
Hinkle, Why Is OII Not Using the Term DSD or “Disorders of Sexual Development”?, OII, 
http://www.intersexualite.org/Response_to_Intersex_Initiative.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
For a more detailed discussion of the debates regarding terminology, see GREENBERG, supra 
note 2, at 118–19; Holmes, supra note 3, at 6–7; and Spurgas, supra note 14, at 97–111. 
 224. See, e.g., Margaret Simmonds, Comments on Consensus Statement on Management of 
Intersex Disorders, ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD (Aug. 17, 2006), http://adc.bmj.com/ 
content/91/7/554/reply; see also Wiesemann et al., supra note 71, at 671 & n.1, 672 (choosing to 
use the term “difference”). 
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This aversion to the term “disorder” stems from the twentieth-
century medical model under which people with disabilities tend to 
evoke pity. Opponents of the DSD terminology fear that the label 
“disorder” will result in people with a DSD being viewed as not fully 
functional.
225
 They are concerned that the societal response will be to 
“cure” their disorder by medically modifying their bodies and 
rehabilitating them so that they can become as “normal” as 
possible.
226
 Opponents of the term “DSD” fear that the label will 
perpetuate stigma and social prejudice because some people view 
those with disabilities as inferior to those who are “normal.”
227
 
Disability rights groups using critical disability theory have 
challenged such frameworks. Instead of focusing on the individual 
who is different, critical disability theorists focus on the barriers that 
society has created to block the full participation of people with 
disabilities.
228
 Under this view, disabilities are only impairments if 
society is not structured so that those with disabilities are able to 
participate fully.
229
 The classic example used to illustrate this 
alternative vision is a person in a wheelchair. Those who cannot walk 
are unable to participate fully in a society that provides only stairs 
and escalators and not ramps and elevators. In a world in which all 
buildings are accessible to those in wheelchairs, those who cannot 
walk are not disabled from full participation. By shifting the focus 
away from the bodies of disabled people and onto societal structures 
that inhibit full participation, critical disability theorists argue that 
body differences can become no more significant than hair or eye 
color.
230
 
Most people with an intersex condition are able to participate 
fully in society and do not consider themselves disabled or 
 
 225. See, e.g., Elizabeth Reis, Divergence or Disorder?: The Politics of Intersex, 50 PERSP. 
BIOLOGY & MED. 535, 535 (2007) (arguing that using the term “disorder” is problematic because 
it implies medical conditions in need of repair, when some intersex anatomies, though atypical, 
do not necessarily need surgical or hormonal correction). 
 226. See, e.g., Emi Koyama, Frequently Asked Questions About the “DSD” Controversy, 
INTERSEX INITIATIVE (June 29, 2008), http://www.ipdx.org/articles/dsdfaq.html. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See Richard Devlin & Dianne Pothier, Introduction: Toward a Critical Theory of Dis-
Citizenship, in CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, POLICY, AND 
LAW 1–2 (Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin eds., 2006). 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id.; Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender 
People Through Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 74 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006); 
Ehrenreich et al., supra note 167, at 116–20. 
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disordered. Critical disability theorists assert that social institutions 
that use bright-line tests to distinguish male bodies from female 
bodies and that view all bodies that do not meet these binary tests as 
abnormal create the disability. The societal disposition to divide 
bodies into normal and abnormal and to privilege some types of 
bodies over others renders people with an intersex condition 
“disabled.” As intersex activist Esther Morris has written, “Being 
born without a vagina was not my problem. Having to get one was 
the real problem.”
231
 
Although some intersex activists oppose the use of a disability 
model, disability laws can be effective tools in the fight against 
discrimination because of their extensive coverage and liberal 
interpretation. People with an intersex condition who suffer 
discrimination in the provision of health care could assert that they 
have been subjected to differential treatment because of their 
perceived disability. Intersex activists could use disability laws and 
join the battle with others in the critical disability movement who are 
working to end the shame and stigma associated with disabilities and 
disorders. If that goal is achieved, people with an intersex condition 
would no longer require disability laws to protect them because the 
perception that they are impaired and in need of fixing will have 
been successfully debunked. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Intersex advocates began challenging current medical practices 
in the mid-1990s. In a relatively short time, the intersex movement 
has increased public awareness about health care issues facing the 
intersex community and commenced a productive dialogue with 
medical practitioners. These educational efforts have led to critical 
changes to some formerly well-accepted practices. Doctors no longer 
feminize all XY infants with smaller penises and they have stopped 
recommending that people with a DSD be told lies or half truths 
about their conditions. 
Most doctors, however, still recommend that parents of 
newborns with a DSD consent to medically unnecessary cosmetic 
genital surgery on behalf of their children. Most parents follow their 
 
 231. Esther Morris Leidolf, An Additional Monologue, MRKR ORG. (Oct. 2000), http:// 
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physician’s advice and approve of these procedures. Although the 
law typically grants great deference to parents regarding the medical 
decisions made on behalf of their children, traditional informed 
consent procedures are inadequate to protect the best interests of 
children with a DSD. Greater oversight of these procedures should 
be imposed for a number of reasons: 
• The surgeries affect important rights. These surgeries 
have the potential to affect a person’s ability to engage in 
satisfactory sexual relations. Although this is not a 
fundamental right on par with the right to reproduce, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the 
constitutionally protected liberty interest encompasses 
the ability to engage in intimate conduct.
232
 Surgeries 
that affect an important constitutionally protected right 
should only be performed with the informed consent of 
the person undergoing the procedure. If the person being 
subjected to the treatment is unable to consent, additional 
safeguards should be imposed to ensure that these 
important rights are not abridged. 
• Parents may not be able to completely understand their 
child’s interests. Parents who consent to cosmetic genital 
surgery have their children’s best interests at heart. 
When parents make these decisions, however, they are 
visualizing their infants as children and not as adult 
sexual beings. Studies show that parents consent to these 
medical interventions because they are concerned about 
the emotional well-being of their offspring as children. 
Studies of adults, however, indicate that the majority of 
adults would not want their parents to consent to these 
surgeries, especially if there is a risk that the medical 
procedure will affect their ability to engage in 
satisfactory sexual relations.
233
 Therefore, these 
procedures should not be performed under traditional 
parental consent practices. 
• These medical procedures are based on sex, gender, and 
sexual orientation stereotypes. Although some infants 
 
 232. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 233. See supra notes 166–69, 190–92, 197–98, and accompanying text. 
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with atypical genitalia must undergo interventions to 
repair conditions that threaten their health, most DSD 
conditions do not impose any health risks. Most of these 
surgeries are undertaken for purely cosmetic reasons. 
These surgeries are performed based on false sex, 
gender, and sexual orientation stereotypes, including the 
assumptions that women prioritize cosmetic appearance 
over sexual pleasure, men need a penis that will allow 
them to urinate in a standing position, and all men and 
women will want to engage in traditional heterosexual 
intercourse. Sex stereotypes should not be used to 
support life-altering health care practices. 
• These surgeries are undertaken not because these infants 
are actually disabled but based on the perception that 
they are impaired. Most infants with a DSD are able to 
participate in all major life functions and are not actually 
disabled or impaired. They are subjected to invasive, 
irreversible, and potentially harmful medical 
interventions to bring their bodies into conformity with 
societal norms. People who are perceived as disabled 
should not be subjected to invasive procedures to 
conform their bodies to societal expectations. The cure is 
not the surgical alteration of the child; the cure is 
educating society to accept bodies that are different. 
Thus far, only one legal institution, the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia, has been asked to address current medical procedures 
performed on infants with a DSD. After an extensive analysis, the 
Colombian court determined that standard informed consent 
practices are inadequate to protect infants with a DSD from 
potentially harmful medical procedures.
234
 Legal institutions in the 
United States and other countries should follow the lead of Colombia 
and consider imposing additional legal safeguards to ensure that the 
rights of people with a DSD are adequately protected. 
No study has proven that cosmetic genital surgeries benefit 
people with a DSD, and evidence exists that these procedures can 
lead to serious physical and emotional harm. Given the interests at 
stake, courts and legislatures should consider imposing legal 
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safeguards to ensure that health care decisions made on behalf of 
infants with a DSD are actually in their best interests. Legal 
institutions should consider imposing a moratorium on these 
procedures until they have been proven to be beneficial, enhancing 
informed consent practices for these procedures, or requiring 
external oversight or approval by a court or hospital ethics 
committee.
235
 
The law recognizes that people whose bodies, behaviors, and 
identities are different require protection from societal 
discrimination. Feminists and LGBT advocates have helped courts 
understand how discrimination based on sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation stereotypes constitutes unlawful sex discrimination. 
Similarly, disability advocates have educated society and legal 
institutions about the need to modify societal norms to fit the needs 
of all people. 
The justifications for performing cosmetic genital surgeries on 
infants with a DSD are based on sex, gender, sexual orientation, and 
disability stereotypes. Current norms require that children raised as 
girls have female appearing genitalia, including a clitoris that is not 
“too large” and a vagina that is capable of accommodating a penis. 
These belief systems also require that children who are going to be 
raised as boys have a penis that is capable of penetrating a vagina 
and that allows the male to stand while urinating. Bodies that fail to 
comport to these standards are often perceived as nonconforming, 
disabled, and in need of repair. Typically, the “fix” is to subject these 
children to surgeries that have, in some cases, led to lifelong physical 
complications and psychological harm. Legal institutions need to 
carefully consider whether these “fixes” constitute impermissible sex 
and disability discrimination. 
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